United States District Court, D. Kansas
CHARLES H. MOORE, JR., Plaintiff,
DANIEL VOKINS, et. al, Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
CROW SENIOR U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE
brings this pro se civil rights action pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff is detained at the Johnson
County Adult Detention Center in Olathe, Kansas. On December
10, 2019, the Court entered a Memorandum and Order and Order
to Show Cause (Doc. 5) (“MOSC”), granting
Plaintiff until January 10, 2020, in which to show good cause
why his Complaint should not be dismissed for the reasons set
forth in the MOSC. Plaintiff has failed to respond to the
MOSC by the Court's deadline.
allegations in Plaintiff's Complaint involve his state
criminal proceedings. Plaintiff alleges that on August 20,
2019, he was falsely arrested at his home and detained on
charges of criminal threat and obstruction. Plaintiff alleges
that these charges were “made up prior to [him] being
arrested.” Plaintiff alleges that he has been locked in
segregation since his arrest and is being “denied all
alleges that he sent a text message to someone stating
“stay away from me or I will break your neck for
putting a false eviction notice on my home, ” and it
was used as an excuse to arrest him for criminal threat.
Plaintiff alleges that the judge raised his bail amount for
no reason and that Plaintiff's motions to the judges have
all been ignored. Plaintiff names four state court judges as
Defendants and seeks release from unjust
Court held in the MOSC that Plaintiff alleges no facts
whatsoever to suggest that the defendant judges acted outside
of their judicial capacities, and Plaintiff's claims
against the state court judges should be dismissed on the
basis of judicial immunity. A state judge is absolutely
immune from § 1983 liability except when the judge acts
“in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.”
Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978)
(articulating broad immunity rule that a “judge will
not be deprived of immunity because the action he took was in
error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his
authority . . . .”); Hunt v. Bennett, 17 F.3d
1263, 1266 (10th Cir. 1994). Only actions taken outside a
judge's judicial capacity will deprive the judge of
judicial immunity. Stump, 435 U.S. at 356-57.
Court also found that Plaintiff's only request for relief
is release from imprisonment. Such a challenge must be
brought in a habeas action. “[A] § 1983 action is
a proper remedy for a state prisoner who is making a
constitutional challenge to the conditions of his prison
life, but not to the fact or length of his
custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
475, 499 (1973) (emphasis added). When the legality of a
confinement is challenged so that the remedy would be release
or a speedier release, the case must be filed as a habeas
corpus proceeding rather than under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
and the plaintiff must comply with the exhaustion of state
court remedies requirement. Heck v. Humphrey, 512
U.S. 477, 482 (1994); see also Montez v. McKinna,
208 F.3d 862, 866 (10th Cir. 2000) (exhaustion of state court
remedies is required by prisoner seeking habeas corpus
relief). “Before a federal court may grant habeas
relief to a state prisoner, the prisoner must exhaust his
remedies in state court. In other words, the state prisoner
must give the state courts an opportunity to act on his
claims before he presents those claims to a federal court in
a habeas petition.” O'Sullivan v.
Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842 (1999); see Woodford v.
Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 92 (2006); Rose v. Lundy, 455
U.S. 509, 518-19 (1982). Therefore, any claim seeking release
from imprisonment is not cognizable in a § 1983 action.
The Court also found that it may be prohibited from hearing
Plaintiff's claims under Younger v. Harris, 401
U.S. 37, 45 (1971).
has failed to respond to the MOSC by the deadline and has
failed to show good cause why his Complaint should not be
dismissed for the reasons set forth in the MOSC.
IS THEREFORE ORDERED BY THE COURT that this matter
IS SO ORDERED.
 Plaintiff has also filed a
“Criminal Complaint” (Doc. 3.) This Court cannot
order criminal charges and cannot order State courts to open
or close cases. See Presley v. Presley, 102
Fed.Appx. 636, 636-37 (10th Cir. 2004) (holding that any
federal court order for “investigation or prosecution
of various people for various crimes” would
“improperly intrude upon the separation of
powers”); Alexander v. Lucas, 259 Fed.Appx.
145, 148 (10th Cir. 2007) (holding that the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred plaintiff's
request that the federal district court order a State-court
judge to grant relief). In addition, to add claims,
significant factual allegations, or change defendants, a
plaintiff must submit a complete amended complaint.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15. An amended complaint is not
simply an addendum to the original complaint, and instead
completely supersedes it. Therefore, any claims or
allegations not included in the amended complaint are no
longer before the court. ...