United States District Court, D. Kansas
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER DISMISSING DEFENDANTS'
D. Crabtree United States District Judge.
this case's two defendants has filed a request asking the
court to “adjust” or “amend” the
restitution component of the judgments entered against them.
See Doc. 239 & Doc. 248. As they correctly recognize,
this court's judgments imposed joint and several
restitution obligations on both Mr. Brown and Mr. Dixon.
See Doc. 149 at 5-6 (entering judgment against Mr.
Brown and imposing restitution obligation of $4, 948 jointly
and severally with Mr. Dixon) & Doc. 150 at 5-6 (entering
judgment against Mr. Dixon and imposing same restitution
obligation, owed jointly and severally with Mr. Brown).
Dixon ignores his duty to establish that the court possesses
jurisdiction to decide his request. But Mr. Brown, to his
credit, recognizes his obligation and argues that 18 U.S.C.
§ 3664(h), “via 3231's general grant” of
jurisdiction, confers authority for the court to decide his
motion. See Doc. 239 at 1-2. The court disagrees
with Mr. Brown's interpretation of federal court
United States v. Benitez, 720 Fed.Appx. 509 (10th
Cir. 2018), the Circuit considered a post-judgment request by
a defendant in a criminal case. In that case, the defendant
had filed a series of motions asking the court to compel his
former attorney to furnish him with his “criminal case
file.” Id. at 510. When the district court
rejected his motions, the defendant appealed. The
Circuit's analysis began with the jurisdictional issue,
finding that the district court had jurisdiction over the
criminal case under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. Id. But,
the Court of Appeals explained, “§ 3231's
grant of jurisdiction ended upon entry of the final
judgment.” Id. (first citing United States
v. Asakevich, 810 F.3d 418, 421 (6th Cir. 2016) (holding
that § 3231 doesn't provide jurisdiction for
district courts to consider post-conviction motions); then
citing United States v. Spaulding, 802 F.3d 1110,
1116-17 (10th Cir. 2015) (rejecting argument that district
court could set aside a guilty plea after entry of final
the court notes Mr. Brown's reliance on Judge
Gorsuch's dissenting opinion in Spaulding. See
Doc. 239 at 2. Even if the court viewed Spaulding as
the precedent controlling this case-and it does not since
that case involved a different post-conviction motion-the
dissenting opinion would not control the decision on these
two motions. This court, of course, must follow the holding
of the court's lead opinion.
that it lacks jurisdiction over Mr. Brown and Mr. Dixon's
motions, the court dismisses both motions. See
Benitez, 720 Fed.Appx. at 511 (“When [a] district
court lacks jurisdiction over a motion, the proper
disposition is ‘dismissal' rather than
IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendant Carl Laneill
Brown's “PETITION SEEKING TO HAVE THE COURT USE ITS
DISCRETION TO ADJUST THE APPORTION OF LIABILITY AMONG
PERTITIONER'S CO-DEFENDANT IN REFLECTING THE ECONOMIC
CIRCUMSTANCE LEVEL TO THE CONTRIBUTION TO THE
RESTITUTION” (Doc. 239) is dismissed for lack of
IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendant LeNard Chauncy
Dixon's “Motion to Amend Restitution” (Doc.
248) is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendant Carl Laneill
Brown's Motion to Appoint Counsel (Doc. 240) is denied as
IS SO ORDERED.
 Mr. Brown filed a “PETITION
SEEKING TO HAVE THE COURT USE ITS DISCRETION TO ADJUST THE
APPORTION OF LIABILITY AMONG PERTITIONER'S CO-DEFENDANT
IN REFLECTING THE ECONOMIC CIRCUMSTANCE LEVEL TO THE
CONTRIBUTION TO THE RESTITUTION.”
Mr. Brown also has filed a Motion to Appoint Counsel
(Doc. 240). It requests the court to appoint counsel for him
“in light of [United States v.]
Davis[, 139 S.Ct. 2319 (2019)].” Id.
at 1. On January 8, 2020, First Assistant Public Defender
Kirk C. Redmond entered his appearance on behalf of Mr.
Brown. Doc. 250. ...