Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Raymond v. Spirit Aerosystems Holdings, Inc.

United States District Court, D. Kansas

August 14, 2019

DONETTA RAYMOND, et al., Plaintiffs,
v.
SPIRIT AEROSYSTEMS HOLDINGS, INC., and SPIRIT AEROSYSTEMS, INC., Defendants.

          MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

          JOHN W. BROOMES UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

         This matter is before the court on Spirit's[1] motion for partial judgment on the pleadings. (Doc. 409.) The motion is fully briefed and is ripe for decision. (Docs. 410, 417, 422.) For the reasons stated herein, Spirit's motion is GRANTED. Plaintiffs' motion for a hearing on the foregoing motion (Doc. 424) is DENIED, as the court determines that oral argument would not assist in deciding the issues presented.

         I. Facts

         Plaintiffs are former Spirit employees in Wichita whose employment was terminated in a July 2013 reduction-in-force (RIF). Plaintiff's fifth claim for relief, based on the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), alleges that after July 2013, “Spirit implemented a policy, procedure, and/or practice of rejecting applications for open positions from individuals terminated in the July 2013 RIF.” (Doc. 1 at 80.) Plaintiffs allege this “failure and refusal to hire former employees terminated in the July 2013 RIF had a significant adverse impact on the work opportunities of former Spirit employees age 40 or above, ” including the Applicant Plaintiffs and the Deterred Applicant Plaintiffs, [2] and was not based on “reasonable factors other than age, ” such that it violated the ADEA. (Id.)

         II. Motion to Dismiss

          Plaintiffs' fifth claim for relief is based on 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(2), which is part of the ADEA's prohibition on age discrimination. It states as follows:

(a) Employer practices
It shall be unlawful for an employer--
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's age;
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's age; or
(3) reduce the wage rate of any employee in order to comply with this chapter.

29 U.S.C.A. § 623(a) (West).[3]

         In Smith v. City of Jackson, Miss., the Supreme Court held that subsection (a)(2) permits claims of disparate impact. Smith, 544 U.S. 228, 232 (2005). At the same time, the Court indicated that subsection (a)(1) only permits claims of disparate treatment.[4] Id. at 236, n.6 (plurality opinion); Texas Dept. of Hous. and Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S.Ct. 2507, 2545 (2015) (Alito, J., dissenting) (noting all of the Justices agreed in Smith that § 632(a)(1) does not authorize disparate-impact claims.) As explained in Smith, the difference arises because the focus of (a)(1) is on an employer's actions with respect to “a targeted individual, ” but in (a)(2) there is “an incongruity between the employer's actions - which are focused on his employees generally - and the individual employee who adversely suffers because of those actions.” Smith, 544 U.S. at 236, n.6. Thus, even absent an intent to discriminate, “an employer who classifies his employees without respect to age may still be liable [under (a)(2)] … if such classification adversely affects the employee because of that employee's age - the very definition of disparate impact.” Id. Although Smith spoke about subsection (a)(2) entirely in terms of the effect of a classification on “employees, ” it did not explicitly address whether this subsection can be applied to non-employee job applicants who claim they were not hired because of the disparate impact of a facially neutral employment policy.

         Spirit moves to dismiss Plaintiff's fifth claim for relief pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c), arguing the ADEA does not authorize failure-to-hire claims under a disparate impact theory. (Doc. 410 at 1.) Claims of discriminatory failure-to-hire must be brought under § 623(a)(1), Spirit argues, which does not permit a disparate impact theory. Plaintiffs' fifth claim for relief is based on § 623(a)(2), which allows disparate impact ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.