United States District Court, D. Kansas
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
D. Crabtree United States District Judge.
the court is pro se defendant Marc Yates's Emergency
Motion for Time Served Pursuant to the Provisions of the
First Step Act of 2018 (Doc. 123). Mr. Yates contends that he
is entitled to immediate release if the court directs the
Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) to recalculate his
good-time credits. Because Mr. Yates challenges the
computation of his sentence, the court construes his Motion
as one filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. The court dismisses
Mr. Yates's Motion without prejudice for the reasons
Yates pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to distribute
more than five kilograms of a mixture and substance
containing a detectable amount of cocaine. Doc. 103 at 1. The
court sentenced Mr. Yates in December 2016 to a term of
imprisonment of 76 months. Id. at 2. After his
prison term, Mr. Yates will be subject to a five-year term of
supervised release. Id. at 3. Mr. Yates's
projected release date from BOP is January 12,
2020. See Inmate Locator, Fed. Bureau
of Prisons, https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/ (select
“Find By Number” tab; enter
“14029-031” into “Number” search box;
and click “Search”) (last visited April 12,
Emergency Motion, Mr. Yates contends-under the First Step Act
of 2018-that BOP must recalculate his good-time credits,
giving him 26 extra days credit. This recalculation, Mr.
Yates contends, would change his release date to December 12,
2019. Then, Mr. Yates asserts, that he is
entitled to 12 months of home confinement. So, Mr. Yates
concludes that he became eligible for home detention in
Mr. Yates has not filed his motion in the correct
jurisdiction, nor has he exhausted administrative
Yates has styled his filing as an Emergency Motion. But, the
court construes his filing as a petition for habeas corpus
under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 because Mr. Yates seeks to
challenge BOP's computation of his good-time credits.
Warren v. United States, 707 Fed.Appx. 509, 511 n.4
(10th Cir. 2017) (“If, for instance, a prisoner seeks
to challenge certain ‘matters that occur at prison,
such as deprivation of good-time credits and other prison
disciplinary matters . . . affecting the fact or duration of
the [prisoner's] custody,' that claim must be raised
in a § 2241 application rather than a § 2255
motion.” (citation omitted)): United States v.
Parrett, No. 01-CR-168-JPS, 2019 WL 1574815, at *2 (E.D.
Wis. Apr. 11, 2019) (“[W]hen the good-time provisions
of the [First Step Act] do go into effect, the proper vehicle
for [the prisoner] to use to request relief (after exhausting
administrative remedies) would be a petition for habeas
corpus under . . . § 2241.”); Rizzolo v.
Puentes, No. 1:19-CV-00290-SKO (HC), 2019 WL 1229772, at
*2 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 15, 2019) (findings and recommendation)
(reasoning that prisoner properly brought claims under §
2241 based on BOP's purported failure to calculate his
sentence in light of the First Step Act and his contention he
should receive more time in a halfway house or home
confinement); United States v. Scouten, No.
13-CR-20S, 2019 WL 1596881, at *1 (W.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 2019)
(“[I]n challenging the Bureau of Prisons' execution
of his sentence, [petitioner's] request for habeas relief
is properly construed under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.”).
And, as a § 2241 petition, the court concludes that it
must be dismissed because Mr. Yates did not file his petition
in the correct jurisdiction nor did he exhaust his
administrative remedies. The court explains these grounds for
dismissal in the next two sections.
Mr. Yates's Motion as one made under § 2241, the
court finds that he must file his motion in the judicial
district where he is incarcerated against “the person
who has custody” over him. Parrett, 2019 WL
1574815, at *2 (“As a general rule, jurisdiction [for a
§ 2241 petition] ‘lies in only one district: the
district of confinement.'” (quoting Rumsfeld v.
Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 443 (2004))); see also
Bradshaw v. Story, 86 F.3d 164, 166 (10th Cir. 1996)
(“A [§ 2241 petition] . . . must be filed in the
district where the prisoner is confined.” (citation
omitted)); United States v. Powell, No.
5:11-CR-75-JMH-1, 2019 WL 1521972, at *1 (E.D. Ky. Apr. 8,
2019) (holding court lacked jurisdiction because the inmate
could “only seek such relief through a § 2241
habeas petition, and [could] only file such petition in the
federal court located in the district in which he is
incarcerated, or where a regional BOP office is
located”). Mr. Yates is incarcerated at the Federal
Medical Center in Fort Worth, Texas. Doc. 123 at 1. The
District of Kansas is not Mr. Yates's district of
confinement, and, accordingly, the court dismisses Mr.
Yates's Motion without prejudice.
Mr. Yates had filed his Motion in the appropriate court, a
federal prisoner generally must exhaust available
administrative remedies before filing a 28 U.S.C. § 2241
habeas petition. Garza v. Davis, 596 F.3d 1198, 1203
(10th Cir. 2010); see also Rizzolo v. Puentes, 2019
WL 1229772, at *2 (“[T]he exhaustion requirement is not
a ‘“jurisdictional prerequisite, ”' and
thus ‘is subject to waiver in § 2241
cases.'” (quoting Ward v. Chavez, 678 F.3d
1042, 1045 (9th Cir. 2012))). Accordingly, our Circuit has
“occasionally waived exhaustion requirements where
irreparable harm would otherwise result.” Steck v.
Chester, 393 Fed.Appx. 558, 560 (10th Cir. 2010);
see also Staples v. Maye, 711 Fed.Appx. 866, 867
(10th Cir. 2017) (explaining that inmates also “need
not exhaust their administrative remedies if they can show
that exhaustion would have been futile.”).
Yates contends that he suffers irreparable harm because his
release date either is imminent or has passed. But, as
discussed below, the court concludes that Mr. Yates's
release date-even if BOP recalculated his good-time credits
today-would be mid-December 2019. The court thus concludes
that the irreparable harm exception is inapplicable.
Mr. Yates has not shown the requisite irreparable harm, he
must comply with exhaustion requirements. Mr. Yates asserts
that BOP staff has taken the position that it will not act
without clear direction from the court. Doc. 123 at 2. But,
Mr. Yates only has attempted to resolve his complaint
informally. Mr. Yates's Motion does not allege that he
has complied with the multi-stage administrative process
under 28 C.F.R. §§ ...