United States District Court, D. Kansas
CHARLES E. FRANCIS, JR., Plaintiff,
CORRECTIONS CORPORATION OF AMERICA, Defendant.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER AND ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
CROW, U.S. SENIOR DISTRICT JUDGE
Charles E. Francis, Jr., a federal prisoner at the
Leavenworth Detention Center in Leavenworth, Kansas
(“CCA-Leavenworth”), brings this
prosecivil rights action 42 U.S.C § 1983. He
proceeds in forma pauperis. For the reasons
discussed below, Plaintiff is ordered to show cause why his
Complaint should not be dismissed.
Nature of the Matter before the Court
Francis's Complaint (ECF No. 1) takes issue with the
medical care he has received while being held at
CCA-Leavenworth. Plaintiff names as defendant Corrections
Corporation of America (CCA), which owns and operates
refers to three separate incidents in the Complaint. First,
Plaintiff was injured on May 16, 2017, when he fell going
through the door to the medical unit, and the metal detector
tipped over and landed on his back. A corrections officer
witnessed the accident. Mr. Francis had a migraine headache
and pain in his knees, ankles, upper neck, and back after the
incident. He was x-rayed, but he seems to dispute the
thoroughness of the x-rays (“they x-rayed what they
wanted to” (ECF No. 1 at 4)). He continues to suffer
pain in his upper and lower back, knees, and ankles, and
continues to have migraine headaches.
second incident, Plaintiff alleges that he suffered a heart
attack in 2018 because a facility doctor gave him the wrong
medication. His heart rate dropped, and he was taken to the
hospital where he stayed overnight and had some tests run.
When he was returned to CCA-Leavenworth, he received no
third incident Plaintiff mentions occurred on August 5, 2018.
Plaintiff states one of the corrections officers slammed his
arms against a door, and one of his hands was swollen as a
result. Plaintiff states that “they did not want to
take me to the hospital and they did not do no x-rays on my
hand”, and his arm continues to hurt. ECF No. 1 at 5.
claims Defendant has not provided him with the treatment that
he needed for his injuries. He seeks compensation for his
pain and suffering.
Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints
Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners
seeking relief against a governmental entity or an officer or
an employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. §
1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion
thereof if a plaintiff has raised claims that are legally
frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §
liberally construes a pro se complaint and applies
“less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted
by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,
94 (2007). In addition, the court accepts all well-pleaded
allegations in the complaint as true. Anderson v.
Blake, 469 F.3d 910, 913 (10th Cir. 2006). On the other
hand, “when the allegations in a complaint, however
true, could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief,
” dismissal is appropriate. Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007).
pro se litigant's “conclusory allegations
without supporting factual averments are insufficient to
state a claim upon which relief can be based.” Hall
v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991).
“[A] plaintiff's obligation to provide the
‘grounds' of his ‘entitlement to relief'
requires “more than labels and conclusions, and a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of
action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations
omitted). The complaint's “factual allegations must
be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative
level” and “to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Id. at 555, 570.
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained “that, to
state a claim in federal court, a complaint must explain what
each defendant did to [the pro se plaintiff]; when
the defendant did it; how the defendant's action harmed
[the plaintiff]; and, what specific legal right the plaintiff
believes the defendant violated.” Nasious v. Two
Unknown B.I.C.E. Agents, 492 F.3d 1158, 1163
(10th Cir. 2007). The court “will not supply
additional factual allegations to round out a plaintiff's
complaint or construct a legal theory on a plaintiff's
behalf.” Whitney v. New Mexico, 113 F.3d 1170,
1173-74 (10th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted).
Tenth Circuit has pointed out that the Supreme Court's
decisions in Twombly and Erickson gave rise
to a new standard of review for § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)
dismissals. See Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1218
(10th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted); see also
Smith v. United States, 561 F.3d 1090, 1098
(10th Cir. 2009). As a result, courts “look
to the specific allegations in the complaint to determine
whether they plausibly support a legal claim for
relief.” Kay, 500 F.3d at 1218 (citation
omitted). Under this new standard, “a plaintiff must
‘nudge his claims across the line from conceivable to
plausible.'” Smith, 561 F.3d at 1098
(citation omitted). “Plausible” in this context
does not mean “likely to be true, ” but rather
refers “to the scope of the allegations in a complaint:
if they are so general that they encompass a wide swath of