United States District Court, D. Kansas
CROW U.S. SENIOR DISTRICT JUDGE
Anthony Earl Ridley brings this pro se civil rights
action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Although Plaintiff was
incarcerated at the Lansing Correctional Facility at the time
of filing, the acts giving rise to his Complaint occurred
while he was in custody at the Sedgwick County Detention
Facility. The Court granted his motion to proceed in
alleges in his Complaint that he was denied a special diet
and religious text in accordance with his Hindu religion, and
that he was excluded from chaplain services. On July 18,
2018, the Court entered a Memorandum and Order and Order to
Show Cause (Doc. 5) (“MOSC”), granting Plaintiff
until August 17, 2018, to either show good cause why his
Complaint should not be dismissed or to file a proper amended
complaint. Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint (Doc. 6).
Court found in the MOSC that: Plaintiff's Complaint is
subject to dismissal based on his failure to exhaust
available administrative remedies before filing this action;
this action is subject to dismissal as against the Board of
Sedgwick County Commissioners, Sedgwick County and Sheriff
Jeff Easter because Plaintiff has not alleged the requisite
causative custom or policy; Plaintiff failed to allege
personal participation by the two John Doe Chaplains;
Plaintiff's claims against Sam Brownback, the
Governor's Constituent Services Office, the State of
Kansas, and any other state agency or employee are subject to
summary dismissal based on sovereign immunity;
Plaintiff's bare conspiracy allegations fail to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted; because Plaintiff is
no longer detained at the Sedgwick County Detention Facility,
his requests for injunctive relief are moot; Plaintiff's
request for compensatory damages is barred by 42 U.S.C.
§ 1997e(e), because Plaintiff has failed to allege a
physical injury; and Plaintiff presents no plausible basis
for a claim of punitive damages because he alleges no facts
whatsoever establishing that any defendant acted with a
sufficiently culpable state of mind.
December 4, 2018, the Court entered a Memorandum and Order
(Doc. 7) finding that Plaintiff's Amended Complaint fails
to address the deficiencies set forth in the MOSC. The Court
found that: although it does not appear that Plaintiff
completed the formal grievance procedures,  even if Plaintiff
exhausted his administrative remedies, the Amended Complaint
fails to state a valid claim for relief; Plaintiff's
Amended Complaint fails to address why his request for
injunctive relief is not moot now that he is no longer
incarcerated; Plaintiff's request for compensatory
damages is barred by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e), because
Plaintiff has failed to allege a physical injury; and
Plaintiff presents no plausible basis for a claim of punitive
damages because he alleges no facts whatsoever establishing
that any defendant acted with a sufficiently culpable state
December 17, 2018, Plaintiff filed a motion for
reconsideration (Doc. 9), asking the Court to reconsider its
December 4, 2018 Memorandum and Order. On December 21, 2019,
the Court denied Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration.
(Doc. 10). On March 13, 2019, Plaintiff filed another motion
for reconsideration (Doc. 11), once again asking the Court to
reconsider its December 4, 2018 Memorandum and Order.
Plaintiff styles his motion as a “Motion for
Reconsideration of Void Judgment and Partial Summary
Judgment.” Plaintiff argues that he is seeking summary
judgment on his claims against the Board of County
Commissioners of Sedgwick County and against the State of
Kansas. Plaintiff then argues that the Defendants violated
the Equal Protection Clause, and cites case law regarding
“deliberate indifference, ” “due process,
” and “equal protection.”
Rule 7.3 provides that “[p]arties seeking
reconsideration of dispositive orders or judgments must file
a motion pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e) or 60.” D. Kan.
Rule 7.3(a). Because Plaintiff's motion was filed more
than 28 days after the entry of the order, the Court will
treat it as a motion under Rule 60. See Fed. R. Civ.
P. 59(e) (“A motion to alter or amend a judgment must
be filed no later than 28 days after the entry of the
motion is treated as a motion filed under Rule 60(b) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking relief from
judgment entered in this matter. See Weitz v.
Lovelace Health System Inc., 214 F.3d 1175,
1178 (10th Cir. 2000). Rule 60(b) provides in relevant part
On motion and just terms, the court may relieve a party or
its legal representative from a final judgment, order, or
proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly
discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could
not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial
under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether previously called
intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or misconduct by
an opposing party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment
has been satisfied, released, or discharged; it is based on
an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or
applying it prospectively is no longer equitable; or (6) any
other reason that justifies relief.
Civ. P. 60(b).
60(b) motion provides extraordinary relief which “may
only be granted in exceptional circumstances.”
Amoco Oil Co. v. United States Environmental Protection
Agency, 231 F.3d 694, 697 (10th Cir. 2000). The decision
to grant such relief “is extraordinary and may only be
granted in exceptional circumstances.” Servants of
the Paraclete v. Does, 204 F.3d 1005, 1009 (10th Cir.
2000) (quotation marks omitted).
does not assert relief under any of the subsections in Rule
60(b), but he does title his motion as a “motion for
reconsideration of void judgment.” Rule 60(b)(4)
provides that the Court may relieve a party from a final
judgment if the judgment is void. Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(4).
“A judgment is void only if the court which rendered it
lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter, or of the parties,
or acted in a manner inconsistent with due process of
law.” Alford v. Cline, 2017 WL 2473311, at *2
(10th Cir. June 8, 2017) (unpublished) (quoting United
States v. Buck, 281 F.3d 1336, 1344 (10th Cir. 2002)).
“Because § 1915A requires a district court to
dismiss a prisoner's civil action for failure to state a
claim as soon as practicable, a judgment dismissing such an
action before service of process isn't void for lack of
personal jurisdiction.” Robertson v. Kansas,
624 Fed.Appx. 969, 971 (10th Cir. 2015) (unpublished).
process is satisfied if “fundamental procedural
prerequisites-particularly, adequate notice and opportunity
to be heard-were fully satisfied.” Alford,
2017 WL 2473311, at *2 (quoting Orner v. Shalala, 30
F.3d 1307, 1310 (10th Cir. 1994)). Plaintiff does not dispute
that he received adequate notice or the opportunity to
present his arguments. See United States v. Rogers,
657 Fed.Appx. 735, 738 (10th Cir. 2016) (unpublished)
(finding that Rule 60(b)(4) argument failed where the court
considered party's claims, discussed the claims, and
adequately addressed party's arguments). A judgment is
not void merely because it is or may have been erroneous.
United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 559 U.S.
260, 270 (2010); Buck, 281 F.3d at 1344 (“[A]
judgment is not void merely because it is erroneous.”).
A Rule 60(b)(4) motion “is not a substitute for a
timely appeal.” Espinosa, 559 U.S. at 270
has not shown that relief under Rule 60(b)(4) or any other
subsection of Rule ...