United States District Court, D. Kansas
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
W. Lungstrum United States District Judge
February 2009, defendant Shannon Perez entered a plea of
guilty to conspiracy to manufacture, to possess with intent
to distribute and to distribute 50 grams or more of cocaine
base and to possess with intent to distribute and to
distribute 5 kilograms or more of cocaine. The court
sentenced Mr. Perez to a 120-month term of imprisonment and a
five-year term of supervised release. Mr. Perez began his
term of supervision in November 2016. This matter is now
before the court on Mr. Perez's motion for early
termination of his supervision. The government opposes the
motion. As will be explained, the motion is granted.
district court has authority to "terminate a term of
supervised release and discharge the defendant released at
any time after the expiration of one year of supervised
release," so long as it considers the factors in §
3553(a) and the release is in the "interest of
justice." 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1); United States
v. Begay, 631 F.3d 1168, 1171-72 (10th Cir. 2011). Mr.
Perez contends that early termination is appropriate because
he has successfully reintegrated into the community, he has
maintained full-time employment with the same employer since
his release and has enjoyed an increase in responsibilities
in his employment; he has strong and stable ties to his
family, church and home; and he is in good standing with the
probation office. Importantly, the probation office supports
Mr. Perez's request for early termination.
government opposes Mr. Perez's motion for two reasons.
First, the government contends that Mr. Perez's request
violates the plea waiver contained in the plea agreement in
which Mr. Perez agreed to waive his right to appeal or
collaterally attack his sentence, including the length of
supervised release. The government has advanced this argument
in two other cases before the court and the court has
rejected that argument both times. See United States v.
Darthard, 09-20156 (doc. 49) and United States v.
Clark, 07-20168-16 (doc. 1869). Because the waiver
language in Mr. Perez's plea agreement is the same as the
waiver language in those other cases (in that the waiver is
limited to the right to challenge a sentence in the context
of a collateral attack), the court reiterates its holding in
those cases and finds that Mr. Perez's motion for early
termination of his supervision does not violate the waiver
because it is not a collateral attack. The court will not
spend any more of its time addressing what it believes is a
totally meritless argument.
the government argues that there is an insufficient basis for
early termination, particularly because Mr. Perez has not
shown extraordinary circumstances warranting early
termination and has a criminal history that warrants
continued supervision. But it is significant to the court
that the probation office has determined that Mr. Perez meets
the eligibility criteria set forth in the applicable statutes
and in Monograph 109, § 380.10-Early Termination. The
probation office is the most familiar with Mr. Perez's
circumstances and conduct since his release and is in the
best position to assess the need for continuing supervision.
Moreover, the eligibility criteria, contrary to the
government's suggestion, do not mandate
"extraordinary circumstances" demonstrating that an
individual is "worthy of special consideration."
See United States v. Harris, 258 F.Supp.3d 137,
149-50 (D.D.C. 2017) ("[C]onstruing § 3583(e)(1) to
require the defendant to exhibit objectively extraordinary or
unusual conduct during supervision is a stretch not expressed
in the statutory text."); United States v.
McFadden, 2017 WL 68649, at *2 (D.N.J. Jan. 5, 2017) (a
defendant need not show extraordinary circumstances to merit
a reduction of supervised release). The government directs
the court to no authority from this Circuit supporting its
argument that an individual seeking early termination of
supervision must demonstrate extraordinary conduct in
additional to full compliance with the terms of supervision.
short, the court concludes that termination of Mr.
Perez's supervision is warranted in light of the factors
in § 3553(a) and is in the interest of justice. He has
successfully reintegrated into the community as evidenced by
his connections to his family and church; he has maintained
consistent employment with the same employer and has
increased his responsibilities with that employer; and he is
in good standing with the probation office. The court is
persuaded that termination of supervised release is warranted
here. Accordingly, the court grants the motion, and
defendant's term of supervised release is hereby
IS THEREFORE ORDERED BY THE COURT THAT Mr
Perez's motion for early termination of supervised
release (doc. 1867) is granted and
defendant's term of supervised release is hereby
IS SO ORDERED.
 The government acknowledges that the
court has previously rejected the argument that it is
advancing here. Nonetheless, the government asserts, without
citation to authority, that Mr. Perez's motion is
somewhat different because his request for early termination
constitutes a request for a sentence below the low end of the
Guidelines in violation of his promise in his plea agreement
to "not request a sentence below the low end of the
guideline range." The court is not persuaded that Mr.
Perez's agreement had anything to do with supervised
release (as opposed to the term of imprisonment) and, in any
event, is not persuaded that a motion ...