from the United States District Court for the District of
Colorado (D.C. No. 1:16-CV-01056-RM-NYW)
M. DeStefano, of Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, Phoenix,
Arizona (Robert B. Carey, of Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP,
Colorado Springs, Colorado, on the briefs), for
A. Moseley (John M. Vaught and Julian R. Ellis, Jr. with him
on the brief), of Wheeler Trigg O'Donnell LLP, Denver,
Colorado, for Defendant-Appellee.
BRISCOE, SEYMOUR, and HOLMES, Circuit Judges.
HOLMES, CIRCUIT JUDGE.
Jeffrey Allen was injured in a car accident in May 2013. His
automobile insurance policy includes coverage for medical
expenses arising from car accidents, but this coverage
contains a one-year limitation period such that he cannot
obtain reimbursement for medical expenses that accrue a year
or more after an accident. Mr. Allen, who seeks reimbursement
for medical expenses accruing more than a year after his
accident, argues that this limitation period is invalid for
two separate reasons. First, he claims that, because a 2012
disclosure form that his insurer sent him stated that his
policy covers reasonable medical expenses arising from a car
accident, Colorado's reasonable-expectations doctrine
renders the one-year limitations period unenforceable.
Second, Mr. Allen argues that Colorado's MedPay statute,
which requires car insurance companies to offer at least $5,
000 of coverage for medical expenses, prohibits placing a
one-year time limit on this coverage. The district court
granted summary judgment in favor of Mr. Allen's insurer,
Defendant-Appellee United Services Automobile Association
("USAA"). We now reject both of Mr. Allen's
arguments and, exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §
1291, affirm the district court's order.
Allen was insured under a car insurance policy purchased by
his wife, Ellen Allen, from USAA. As relevant here, the
policy's coverage period ran from December 5, 2012 to
June 5, 2013, though Ms. Allen obtained the policy years
before that. The policy included $100, 000 of coverage for
"medical payments." Aplt.'s App., Vol. III, at
711 (Auto Policy Renewal Declarations, filed Oct. 26, 2017)
(capitalization omitted). The policy stated that USAA
"will pay only the medical payment fee for medically
necessary and appropriate medical services" and that
"[t]hese fees and expenses must . . . [r]esult from [a
bodily injury] sustained by a covered person in an auto
accident; and . . . [b]e incurred for services rendered
within one year from the date of the auto accident."
Id., Vol. I, at 203 (Ex. A-2 to Def.'s Statement
of Undisputed Facts, filed Oct. 26, 2017). While the policy
initially contained a three-year limitation period for
medical payments, USAA sent Ms. Allen a disclosure in 2006
informing her of "Important Changes to Your Auto
Policy," which included that the "time limit for
Medical Payments Coverage is reduced from three years . . .
to one year from the date of [an] accident."
Id. at 177 (Ex. A-1 to Def.'s Statement of
Undisputed Facts, filed Oct. 26, 2017). It is undisputed
that, notwithstanding this change to her policy, Ms. Allen
renewed it in December 2006 and continued to renew it
thereafter until the car accident that forms the basis of
this case occurred.
2012, USAA sent the Allens a "Summary Disclosure
Form" that purported to be "a basic guide to the
major coverages and exclusions in your policy."
Id. at 222 (capitalization omitted). The disclosure
form stated that it was "not a policy of any kind,"
and instructed the Allens to "please read your policy
for complete details" because "this summary
disclosure form shall not be construed to replace any
provision of the policy itself." Id.
(capitalization omitted). The disclosure form discussed the
Allens' "[m]edical payments coverage" under
their policy. Id. at 224. It stated that this
"[m]edical payments coverage pays for you and your
passengers['] reasonable health care expenses incurred
for bodily injury caused by an automobile accident."
Id. The portion of the disclosure form discussing
medical-payments coverage further instructed the Allens to
"[p]lease read your policy for other conditions and
2013, within the policy's coverage period, Mr. Allen was
involved in a car accident. Mr. Allen began suffering lower
back pain shortly afterward. The policy provided coverage for
up to $100, 000 worth of medical payments within the one-year
limitation period. According to a clinical assessment carried
out about a year after the accident, Mr. Allen's pain
"range[d] anywhere from mild to severe on a daily
basis." Id., Vol. III, at 625 (Ex. A-2 to
Pl.'s Resp. to Def.'s Statement of Facts, filed Oct.
26, 2017). By June 2014, when the one-year limitation period
on medical-payments coverage under Mr. Allen's policy had
ended, USAA had paid out about $18, 000 of the $100, 000
coverage amount. Mr. Allen continued to receive medical
treatment for problems stemming from the accident, but USAA
refused to make further payments because the limitation
period had been reached.
2016, Mr. Allen brought a class action suit against USAA, on
behalf of "all insureds of [USAA]," in federal
district court in Colorado. Id., Vol. I, at 10
(Class Action Compl., filed Oct. 26, 2017). He alleged
diversity jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act,
28 U.S.C. § 1332(d). Mr. Allen sought damages for,
inter alia, breach of contract, the tort of bad
faith, and deceptive trade practices, all under Colorado law.
He also asked for declaratory relief that would have the
effect of vitiating the time limits for medical-payments
coverage in class members' policies.
filed an Answer to Mr. Allen's complaint in September
2016. In December 2016, USAA moved for summary judgment, and
the district court granted this motion in July 2017. The
district court entered final judgment against Mr. Allen on
July 10, 2017, and Mr. Allen timely appealed.
review a district court's summary-judgment order de
novo," and summary judgment "is appropriate when
'the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to
any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.'" Dullmaier v. Xanterra Parks
& Resorts, 883 F.3d 1278, 1283 (10th Cir. 2018)
(quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a)). As to materiality, "[o]nly
disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit
under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of
summary judgment." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). And disputes are genuine
"if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could
return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id.
We "view the evidence and draw reasonable inferences
therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party" at the summary-judgment stage.
Dullmaier, 883 F.3d at 1283 (quoting Simms v.
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