BY THE COURT
K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 22-2401a(2) generally authorizes law
enforcement officers employed by a city to act within the
city's limits, on property owned by or under the control
of the city, and "in any other place when a request for
assistance has been made by law enforcement officers from
that place or when in fresh pursuit of a person."
Under the "request for assistance" exception in
K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 22-2401a(2)(b), city law enforcement
officers cannot exercise police powers outside the boundaries
of their own city unless they have received a request for
assistance from the law enforcement officers of the other
place. Mere acquiescence or acceptance of assistance by the
officers of the invaded jurisdiction after notification by
the invading officers does not constitute a request for
assistance under K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 22-2401a(2)(b).
Legislature adopted K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 22-2401a's
statutory limitations on the jurisdiction of city law
enforcement officers to protect the local autonomy of
neighboring cities and counties, rather than to create an
Generally, the remedy of suppression is unavailable if law
enforcement officers conduct a search in violation of state
statute only and the statute violated does not vest a
defendant with an individual right, the statute violated does
not contemplate exclusion of evidence as a remedy, and the
violation results in no cognizable injury to a
defendant's substantial rights.
general, appellate courts review a district court's
factual findings relating to a motion to suppress for
substantial competence evidence-evidence that is relevant,
substantive, and furnishes a substantial basis in fact from
which the issues can reasonably be resolved. Appellate courts
do not reweigh evidence, assess the credibility of witnesses,
or resolve conflicts in evidence and instead give great
deference to the factual findings of the district court,
including when a district court draws reasonable factual
inferences from the evidence.
Suppression of evidence is a deterrent measure, not a
personal right. So courts restrict its application to those
situations that effectively advance its remedial purpose.
of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in an unpublished
opinion filed October 27, 2017.
from Johnson District Court; Thomas E. Foster, judge.
Ann Uvodich, of Olathe, argued the cause and was on the brief
J. Jennings, assistant district attorney, argued the cause,
and Stephen M. Howe, district attorney, and Derek Schmidt,
attorney general, were with him on the briefs for appellee.
2017 Supp. 22-2401a(2) authorizes law enforcement officers
employed by a city to act within the city's limits, on
property owned by or under the control of the city, and
"in any other place when a request for assistance has
been made by law enforcement officers from that place or when
in fresh pursuit of a person." Here, the district court
held the Prairie Village Police Department (PVPD) violated
this statute when it orchestrated two controlled buys from
J.O., a juvenile, at her residence in Shawnee. The district
court also found the PVPD committed willful and recurrent
violations of the statute, in part because the buys occurred
after this court held the PVPD had violated the statute in
circumstances similar to this case. See State v.
Vrabel, 301 Kan. 797, 347 P.3d 201 (2015).
appeal, the parties do not dispute the district court's
conclusion that the PVPD violated K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 22-2401a
(at least once) or its findings that the PVPD officers acted
willfully and that the PVPD had repeatedly violated the
statute. Instead, the parties focus on whether the district
court should have suppressed the evidence. We reject
J.O.'s request for an order of suppression because (1)
the district court took other action to deter future
violations of the statute, (2) J.O. does not allege a
constitutional violation or otherwise state a cognizable
injury to her substantial rights, and (3) K.S.A. 2017 Supp.
22-2401a does not vest J.O. with an individual right.
AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
district court made the following detailed factual findings:
"At around 8:00 a.m. on August 24, 2015, a confidential
informant ('CI') advised Officer Travis Gray of the
Prairie Village Police Department ('PVPD') that
[J.O.] had marijuana wax for sale in Shawnee, Kansas. At
Gray's request, the CI arranged to buy drugs from [J.O.]
in Shawnee at 3:00 p.m. later that day. At around 2:15 p.m.,
prior to the buy, Gray contacted Sergeant Brent Griffin of
the Shawnee Police Department ('SPD') to 'see if
they could assist us in the buy that we had set up.'
Griffin notified Gray that the SPD had no personnel available
to assist PVPD with the controlled buy.
"Around 3:00 p.m. the CI met [J.O.] in Shawnee and
purchased marijuana wax from [J.O.]. Officer Gray surveilled
the transaction and later received the marijuana wax from the
CI. SPD officers were not present at the buy location and did
not provide assistance to Gray. The PVPD officers ...