United States District Court, D. Kansas
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
MURGUIA UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Kendrick Dewayne Moore brings this case pro se, claiming that
defendants Rod Taylor, Jake Cox, and Brodan Gaede violated
his constitutional rights when plaintiff was housed in the
Thomas County jail on April 25, 2015. Defendants Cox and
Gaede (“Thomas County defendants”) filed Thomas
County Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 29).
Plaintiff also filed his own Motion for Summary Judgment
(Doc. 40). In response to plaintiff's motion, defendant
Taylor asked for summary judgment in his favor, as well. But
defendant Taylor did not comply with this court's rules
governing the filing of a dispositive motion in a case
against a pro se plaintiff, and the court therefore construes
his response as just that: a response to plaintiff's
motion, and not a cross-motion for summary judgment.
following facts are taken from defendants' motion for
summary judgment and their responses to plaintiff's
motion for summary judgment, as plaintiff failed to properly
controvert any of defendants' proposed facts or
adequately support his own proposed facts. To the extent
warranted, the court has also considered the facts proposed
by plaintiff, but for the most part, they consist of
unsupported allegations and conclusory statements.
was arrested on April 25, 2015 and booked into the Thomas
County Jail. The jail is a small facility, with fifteen beds
on one floor. It has one cell, called the “detox cell,
” that holds one detainee and may be used to provide a
safe space for disruptive detainees.
plaintiff was arrested, he began banging his head against the
patrol car's window and refused to stop. He was placed in
a group cell at the jail, but then began banging the
cell's telephone against the wall. Sometime after 5:45
p.m., Defendant Gaede moved plaintiff to the detox cell.
While there, plaintiff began yelling and banging against the
door. The dispatcher eventually placed a system-wide call for
officers to address the jail disturbance. Defendant Gaede
then left the facility at 8:00 p.m., when his shift ended.
remained agitated and loud, and at 7:59 p.m., defendant
Taylor stated that he planned to move plaintiff from the
jail's main building to the “Lester”
building, which is next to the jail's main building and
serves as a garage and storage space. Defendant Taylor
originally planned to use a suicide blanket, reinforced with
duct tape, to restrain plaintiff for the move. He later
changed his mind and had defendant Cox place plaintiff in
handcuffs and a belly chain to take plaintiff to the Lester
building. Presumably in connection with defendant
Taylor's abandoned original plan to restrain plaintiff
for the move, plaintiff claims that defendant Taylor
threatened to hang plaintiff and duct tape him to a chair.
Ultimately, defendant Taylor took neither of these actions.
the Lester building, defendant Taylor sat in a chair and
allowed plaintiff to pace freely (although still in
handcuffs). Defendant Cox left to get plaintiff shoes that
fit better, and placed an audio recording device in the
building to record the interactions between plaintiff and
defendant Taylor. Neither defendant Taylor nor plaintiff knew
about the recording device. The audio recording contains no
threats by defendant Taylor against plaintiff. It does,
however, contain over an hour of offensive and abusive
language by plaintiff toward defendant Taylor. Neither of the
Thomas County defendants ever heard defendant Taylor threaten
Cox returned to the Lester building periodically throughout
the evening. Around 9:15 or 9:30 p.m., he moved
plaintiff's handcuffs from his back to his front so
plaintiff could lie down on a mattress. About 10:20 p.m.,
defendant Cox helped escort plaintiff back to the detox call.
Plaintiff did not sustain any injuries during the night, and
did not submit any medical requests or grievances related to
the incident. Plaintiff was returned to a group cell the
judgment is appropriate if the moving party demonstrates that
there is “no genuine issue as to any material
fact” and that it is “entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). In applying this
standard, the court views the evidence and all reasonable
inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party. Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144
F.3d 664, 670 (10th Cir. 1998) (citing Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587
as here, the plaintiff proceeds pro se, the court construes
the pro se filings liberally. Hall v. Doering, 997
F.Supp. 1445, 1451 (D. Kan. 1998) (citing Hughes v.
Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9-10 (1980)). On the other hand, a
plaintiff's pro se status does not relieve him from
complying with this court's procedural requirements.
Barnes v. United States, 173 Fed.Appx. 695, 697
(10th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted); see also
Santistevan v. Colo. Sch. of Mines, 150 Fed.Appx. 927,
931 (10th Cir. 2005) (holding that a pro se litigant must
follow the same rules of procedure as other litigants). As
noted previously, plaintiff's response includes little
support for his allegations (other than that evidence already
provided by defendants), and the court therefore evaluates
the merits of defendants' motion based solely on the
evidence presented by defendants. Although plaintiff filed
affidavits in the record, he did not file them with his
summary judgment motion or his response, and he did not
reference them in either document. The court therefore has
not considered Docs. 36 or 37 in ruling on the pending
The Thomas County Defendants' Motion for ...