Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Kling v. Garcia

United States District Court, D. Kansas

January 3, 2018

DOUGLAS A. KLING, Plaintiff,
v.
JAYSON GARCIA, LOREN SNEDEKER, and KANSAS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Defendants.

          MEMORANDUM & ORDER

          CARLOS MURGUIA UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

         This matter comes before the court upon defendants Jayson Garcia and Loren Snedeker's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 22). For the reasons explained below, defendants' motion is granted.

         I. Background

         Plaintiff Douglas A. Kling filed an amended complaint on August 23, 2016 (Doc. 5). Plaintiff used the form Civil Rights Complaint for claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff claims that defendant Garcia violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, by attacking plaintiff on March 26, 2014, “pushing, punching and pulling Plaintiff's hair out . . . in the clinic at HCF” and plaintiff claims there are witnesses and video footage of the incident. (Doc. 5, at 3). Plaintiff claims that his right to due process under the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments were violated when defendant Garcia issued a disciplinary report after the incident, resulting in a disciplinary hearing, over which defendant Snedeker presided and required plaintiff to pay a fine. (Id.) Plaintiff claims he was not given notice and was not present for his hearing. (Id. at 2.)

         Plaintiff claims that he has filed multiple forms seeking relief from the actions he complains of and states that he has exhausted the disciplinary appeal process. He claims $5, 274 in actual damages and $150, 000 in exemplary damages from defendant Garcia; $254 in actual and $15, 000 in exemplary damages from defendant Snedeker; and $1 in nominal damages for each violation. He requests a jury trial.

         II. Legal Standard

         A. Pro Se Litigants

         Where a plaintiff proceeds pro se, the court construes his filings liberally and holds them to less stringent standards than pleadings filed by lawyers. Barnett v. Corr. Corp of Am., 441 Fed.Appx. 600, 601 (10th Cir. 2011). Pro se plaintiffs are nevertheless required to follow the Federal and Local Rules of practice and the court does not assume the role of advocating for plaintiff. United States v. Porath, 553 Fed.Appx. 802, 803 (10th Cir. 2014).

         B. Summary Judgment

         Summary judgment is appropriate if the moving party demonstrates that there is “no genuine issue as to any material fact” and that it is “entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). In applying this standard, the court views the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 670 (10th Cir. 1998) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)).

         The party moving for summary judgment has the burden to show “the lack of a genuine issue of material fact.” Ascend Media Prof'l Servs., LLC v. Eaton Hall Corp., 531 F.Supp.2d 1288, 1295 (D. Kan. 2008) (citing Spaulding v. United Transp. Union, 279 F.3d 901, 904 (10th Cir. 2002) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986))). Once the moving party meets this initial burden, the burden then shifts to the nonmovant to “set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. (citing Spaulding, 279 F.3d at 904 (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986))).

         The nonmovant may not rest on his pleadings or “rely on ignorance of the facts, on speculation, or on suspicion and may not escape summary judgment in the mere hope that something will turn up at trial.” Id. (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 259 (1986)); Conaway v. Smith, 853 F.2d 789, 794 (10th Cir. 1988). Instead, the nonmovant is required to set forth specific facts, by referencing affidavits, deposition transcripts, or exhibits, from which a rational trier of fact could find for him. Fed R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1); see also Ascend Media, 531 F.Supp.2d at 1295 (citing Adams v. Am. Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 233 F.3d 1242, 1246 (10th Cir. 2000)). Summary judgment is not a “disfavored procedural shortcut” -it is an “integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.” Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 327 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 1).

         B. Summary Judgment Briefing Procedure

         As required by the local rules, defendants set forth a statement of uncontroverted facts, separately numbered and referring with particularity to those portions of the record upon which each statement relies. D. Kan. Rule 56.1(a). The rules provide that all facts set forth in such a statement are deemed admitted for the purposes of summary judgment unless specifically controverted by the statement of the opposing party. The responding party must “refer with particularity to those portions of the record upon which the opposing party relies.” D. Kan. Rule 56.1(b)(1). The Rules further provide that if the nonmoving party “relies on any facts not contained in the movant's memorandum, that party must set forth each additional fact in a separately numbered paragraph, supported by references to the record.” Rule 56.1(b)(2). “All facts on which a motion or opposition is based must be presented by affidavit, declaration under penalty of ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.