United States District Court, D. Kansas
JONATHON L. MANGOLD, Plaintiff,
STATE OF KANSAS, et al., Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER AND ORDER TO SHOW
Crow U.S. Senior District Judge
Plaintiff Jonathon L. Mangold, is hereby required to show
good cause, in writing, to the Honorable Sam A. Crow, United
States District Judge, why this action should not be
dismissed due to the deficiencies in Plaintiff's
Complaint that are discussed herein.
Nature of the Matter before the Court
originally filed this case pro se in the Marion
County District Court. Defendants State of Kansas and Marion
County removed the action to this Court under 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1441 and 1446.
the KDOC website reflects that Plaintiff is currently
incarcerated at the Norton Correctional Facility in Norton,
Kansas (“NCF”),  the events giving rise to
Plaintiff's Complaint appear to have taken place during
his detention at the Marion County Jail in Marion, Kansas
(“MCJ”). Plaintiff claims violations of his 14th
Amendment rights, “mistreatment of a confined person,
” cruel and unusual punishment, and “treating
others with favoritism.”
alleges that on September 19, 2017, he was placed in
segregation after he had an altercation with CO Paul.
Plaintiff called out CO Paul's name, and CO Paul came
into A-Pod and grabbed Plaintiff and “choked him
out” all the way to A-1, then all the way into booking.
Plaintiff's actions dictated a seventy-two hour
segregation placement. Plaintiff was denied bedding for three
hours and then was only provided a blanket for four days.
Plaintiff was denied access to his legal documents
“during said time” as well as phone calls to
anyone including his attorney. Plaintiff was held in booking
for three days without a shower, toothpaste or soap.
September 22, 2017, CO Miles told Plaintiff that he had
spoken with jail administrator “Jimmy” and
Plaintiff would be moved out of lockdown that day. However,
CO Zach and CO Paul refused to move Plaintiff. Instead,
Plaintiff was moved to “medico” because he had an
altercation with another inmate.
September 24, 2017, Plaintiff was going across the hall to
his cell after receiving a haircut in D-Pod. Inmate Dakota
wanted another inmate to “whip up” on Plaintiff,
so he closed Plaintiff in D-Pod as he was going to work and
told another inmate to assault Plaintiff. When CO Zach opened
the door to D-Pod to let Plaintiff into medico, inmate Dakota
punched Plaintiff through the food slot while slapping CO
Zach's hand away. Plaintiff has been on lockdown for two
weeks for calling out a CO's name, flooding a booking
cell, and smearing coffee on a window. Plaintiff claims
inmate Dakota received preferential treatment because he only
received twenty-four hours in a booking cell, transfer to
B-Pod for one week, and then he received his trustee job
back. Plaintiff alleges that he remains in segregation
despite his request to be moved to general population, and
officers say “they have nowhere to put him.”
Plaintiff alleges that CO Paul interfered with his access to
bond. Lorie Hill told Plaintiff that she was going to
“bond him out, ” but CO Paul told her about
Plaintiff's actions at the jail, that Plaintiff might be
held on other warrants, i.e. child support, and that
Plaintiff allegedly owes another bondsman.
alleges that he has made at least twelve medical requests to
see a doctor and dentist. Even though Plaintiff eats, his
stomach cramps and severely hurts as if he has not eaten for
weeks. Plaintiff is having seizures too frequently, and
Plaintiff cannot eat chips or cereal because his top gums are
getting sore and starting to bleed. Plaintiff only has half
of his top dentures, so they will not stay in even with
denture cream. Plaintiff still has not been seen even though
it has been almost three weeks since he first complained.
Plaintiff has not had access to the canteen for three weeks,
and the portions of food served are too small and do not
equal federal guidelines of a 2500 calorie diet.
names as Defendants the State of Kansas and Marion County,
Kansas. Plaintiff seeks damages of one million dollars for
mental and emotional distress, and proper care and treatment.
Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints
Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners
seeking relief against a governmental entity or an officer or
an employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. §
1915A(a). Section “1915A applies to all prison
litigants, without regard to their fee status, who bring
civil suits against a governmental entity, officer, or
employee.” Plunk v. Givens, 234 F.3d 1128,
1129 (10th Cir. 2000); see also Martin v. Scott, 156
F.3d 578, 579-80 (5th Cir. 1998) (finding that the statutory
screening provision under § 1915A applies to all
prisoners' actions against governmental entities,
officers, and employees, regardless whether the prisoner is
proceeding in forma pauperi). The independent duty
to screen prisoner complaints therefore extends to prisoner
actions that have been removed from state court. See Duff
v. Yount, 51 F. App'x. 520, 521 (6th Cir. 2002)
(screening removed prisoner action under §§ 1915(e)
and 1915A). Accordingly, the Court will screen
Plaintiff's Complaint under § 1915A. The Court must
dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff has
raised claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that
fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or
that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from
such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)-(2).
state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the
violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of
the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation
was committed by a person acting under color of state
law.” West v. Atkins,487 U.S. 42, 48
(1988)(citations omitted); Northington v. Jackson,
973 F.2d 1518, 1523 (10th Cir. 1992). A court liberally
construes a pro se complaint and applies “less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94
(2007). In addition, the court accepts all well-pleaded
allegations in the complaint as true. Anderson v.
Blake, 469 F.3d 910, 913 (10th Cir. 2006). On the other