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KS v. United States

United States District Court, D. Kansas

December 5, 2017

JOHN DOE KS and JANE DOE KA, Plaintiffs,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA and MARK WISNER, Defendants.

          MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

          CARLOS MURGUIA UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

         Plaintiffs John Doe KS and Jane Doe KA bring this case against defendants United States of America and Mark Wisner, pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671 and 38 U.S.C. § 7316(a), (f), alleging that Wisner conducted improper and/or unnecessary physical examinations of plaintiff KS and elicited unnecessary private information. Plaintiffs also allege several state law claims. This matter is before the court on defendant United States of America's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 4). Defendant argues that plaintiffs' complaint should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and because it fails to state a claim under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and (6). For the reasons set forth below, the court grants defendant's motion in part and denies it in part.

         I. Factual Background and Legal Standards

         Plaintiff KS is a veteran who sought treatment at the Dwight D. Eisenhower VA Medical Center (“VA”) located in Leavenworth, Kansas. Wisner treated and provided medical care for plaintiff KS. Plaintiff KA is plaintiff KS's wife. Wisner was a physician's assistant (“PA”) for the VA, and is a defendant in more than seventy pending civil suits before this court.

         The claims in this case are virtually identical to those in a number of other cases this court has considered. See, e.g., Anasazi v. United States, No. 16-2227-CM, 2017 WL 2264441, at *1-*2 (D. Kan. May 23, 2017); Doe v. United States, No. 16-2162-CM, 2017 WL 1908591, at *1-*2 (D. Kan. May 10, 2017). The court will not repeat the details of them here. Highly summarized, they are: (1) Count I: Negligence - Medical Malpractice; (2) Count II: Negligent Supervision, Retention and Hiring; (3) Count III: Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress; (4) Count IV: Outrage; (5) Count V: Battery; and (6) Count VI: Invasion of Privacy - Intrusion Upon Seclusion.

         Likewise, the court has set forth the governing legal standards in a number of other cases involving the same parties and claims. The court does not repeat them here, but applies them as it has in the past. See, e.g., Anasazi, 2017 WL 2264441, at *2; Doe, 2017 WL 1908591, at *2.

         II. Discussion

         Under the FTCA, the United States has waived its sovereign immunity for injuries caused by the “negligent or wrongful act or omission” of a federal government employee while that employee is “acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.” 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b).

         This court has repeatedly held that plaintiffs with similar allegations to those here have sufficiently alleged that Wisner's conduct was within the scope of his employment. See, e.g., Anasazi, 2017 WL 2264441, at *4; Doe, 2017 WL 1908591, at *4. The court also has held that plaintiffs with similar allegations have presented plausible claims that the VA Immunity Statute applies, allowing them to pursue remedies under the FTCA for claims arising out of a battery. See, e.g., Anasazi, 2017 WL 2264441, at *5; Doe, 2017 WL 1908591, at *4.

         Defendant does not rehash the same arguments that it made in previous cases about scope of employment and the VA Immunity Statute. But defendant does argue that the allegations in plaintiffs' complaint are more in the nature of intentional sexual assault than negligence. Defendant claims that plaintiffs' allegations are inconsistent with the position that Wisner engaged in conduct that was a slight deviation from his scope of employment, and asks the court to revisit its prior findings. The court addresses this, along with the other new arguments of defendant, below.

         A. Plaintiff KA

         Defendants first moves to dismiss the claims of plaintiff KA because they are derivative of the claims of plaintiff KS. Plaintiff KS was the patient. Plaintiff KA was merely present during some of the medical appointments.

         Kansas does not recognize a separate cause of action for spousal loss of consortium due to injuries to the other spouse. Sayre v. City of Lawrence, No. 13-2291-RDR, 2013 WL 4482703, at *2 (D. Kan. Aug. 21, 2013) (citation omitted). Instead, “the right to recover for loss of consortium lies with the spouse who files an action for personal injuries, not the spouse who actually suffers the loss of consortium.” Stucky v. Health Care Prod., Inc., 794 F.Supp. 1069, 1070 (D. Kan. 1992).

         Plaintiff KA claims that she is not only bringing claims for loss of consortium-she is also bringing causes of action for her own damages. She claims she is entitled to her own damages because she witnessed ...


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