United States District Court, D. Kansas
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
D. Crabtree United States District Judge.
April 11, 2017, Judge Sebelius issued a Report and
Recommendation denying plaintiff's Motion for Leave to
Proceed In Forma Pauperis. Doc. 4. On April 12, 2017,
plaintiff filed a document he titled “Motion to be
Exempt from Paying Filing Fees.” Doc. 5. The court
considered this document as an objection to Judge
Sebelius's Report and Recommendation. Doc. 8 at 2. The
court denied plaintiff's objection and adopted Judge
Sebelius's Report and Recommendation on May 11, 2017.
Id. at 5.
days later, plaintiff filed a document he titled
“Andrew Neighbors['s] Objection to the Judge/Court
Denying Him to Proceed Without Payment of Fees and Request
for Recon[s]ideration.” Doc. 9. Because plaintiff
brings this lawsuit pro se, the court construes his filings
liberally and holds them to a less stringent standard than
formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. See Hall v.
Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir.
1991). But the court cannot assume the role of
plaintiff's advocate and plaintiff's pro se status
does not excuse him from “the burden of alleging
sufficient facts on which a recognized legal claim could be
based.” Id. Nor is plaintiff relieved from
complying with the rules of the court or facing the
consequences of noncompliance. Nielsen v. Price, 17
F.3d 1276, 1277 (10th Cir. 1994). The court thus construes
this filing as one presenting a motion for reconsideration
under D. Kan. Rule 7.3(b) and considers it on that basis.
D. Kan. Rule 7.3(b), a party may seek review of a
non-dispositive order “within 14 days after the order
is filed.” The rule requires a movant to base its
motion for reconsideration on “(1) an intervening
change in controlling law; (2) the availability of new
evidence; or (3) the need to correct clear error or prevent
manifest injustice.” D. Kan. Rule 7.3(b). A motion to
reconsider “is not appropriate to revisit issues
already addressed or advance arguments that could have been
raised in prior briefing.” Ferluga v.
Eickhoff, 236 F.R.D. 546, 549 (D. Kan. 2006) (citing
Servants of Paraclete v. Does, 204 F.3d 1005, 1012
(10th Cir. 2000)). So, “a motion for reconsideration is
appropriate [only] where the court has misapprehended the
facts, a party's position, or the controlling law.”
Id. (citing Servants of Paraclete, 204 F.3d
at 1012). “The decision whether to grant a motion to
reconsider is committed to the district court's
discretion.” Coffeyville Res. Ref. & Mktg., LLC
v. Liberty Surplus Ins. Corp., 748 F.Supp.2d 1261, 1264
(D. Kan. 2010) (citing In re Motor Fuel Temperature Sales
Practices Litig., 707 F.Supp.2d 1145, 1166 (D. Kan.
2010)); Brumark Corp. v. Samson Res. Corp., 57 F.3d
941, 944 (10th Cir. 1995).
motion to reconsider, plaintiff reiterates his earlier
argument that the Supreme Court has held that “natural
individuals, ” such as he is, are “entitled to
relief [and] entitled to free access to the court.”
Id. at 3. The court rejected this argument
previously because none of the case law plaintiff relied on
“permit[s] litigants to proceed in court without paying
filing fees.” Doc. 8 at 4. Plaintiff's motion to
reconsider recites the exact same argument and case law as
his Motion to be Exempt from Paying Filing Fees. The court
therefore denies his motion for the same reasons it denied
his Motion to be Exempt from Paying Filing Fees. See
motion to reconsider also includes a section titled
“Acceptance of Constitutions and Oath of Office.”
Doc. 9 at 2. This section is hard to follow and, frankly, the
court cannot discern its intended meaning. Whatever its
intent, plaintiff's apparent attempt to bind the court
and its officers to a contract through his “Acceptance
of Constitutions and Oath of Office” is improper, and
it has no legal effect or consequence to this action.
IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT Andrew Neighbors's
Objection to the Judge/Court Denying Him to Proceed Without
Payment of Fees and Request for Recondideration (Doc. 9) is
IS SO ORDERED.
 In several filings, plaintiff refers
to himself as proceeding “in propria persona.”
See Doc. 9 at 1. As noted above, the pro se standard
in our Circuit requires courts to hold a pro se
litigant's filings to a less stringent standard than
formal pleadings drafts by lawyers. Hall, 935 F.2d
at 1110. The court applies this standard because the Tenth
Circuit requires it. Also, though the terms “in propria
persona” and “pro se” once had slightly
different legal meanings under former rules of pleading, the
terms no longer have distinct meanings. Braun v.
Stotts, No. 93-3118-GTV, 1997 WL 383034, at *1 (D. Kan.
June 19, 1997), aff'd, 134 F.3d 382 (10th Cir.