Juan A. Apodaca, Appellant,
Mark Willmore, Matthew Willmore, and Oak River Insurance Company, Appellees.
firefighter's rule first enunciated by this court in
Calvert v. Garvey Elevators, Inc., 236 Kan.
570, 694 P.2d 433 (1985), is extended to law enforcement
the facts of this case, none of the three exceptions to
application of the firefighter's rule recognized in
Calvert v. Garvey Elevators, Inc., 236 Kan. 570, 694
P.2d 433 (1985), a rule now extended to law enforcement
the record in this case, the plaintiff is procedurally barred
from pursuing adoption of a fourth, willful and wanton
conduct exception to the firefighter's rule, now extended
to law enforcement officers.
of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in 51 Kan.App.2d 534,
349 P.3d 481 (2015). Appeal from Shawnee District Court;
Larry D. Hendricks, judge. Judgment of the Court of Appeals
affirming the district court is affirmed. Judgment of the
district court is affirmed.
D. Fincher, of Bryan, Lykins, Hejtmanek & Fincher, of
Topeka, argued the cause and was on the brief for appellant.
W. Riggs, of Larson & Blumreich Chartered, of Topeka,
argued the cause, and Craig C. Blumreich, of the same firm,
was on the brief for appellee.
appeal from summary judgment granted to the defendants in
district court, we decide whether to extend a common-law tort
doctrine known as the firefighter's rule to law
that the firefighter's rule first enunciated by this
court in Calvert v. Garvey Elevators, Inc., 236 Kan.
570, 694 P.2d 433 (1985), should be extended to law
enforcement officers. We therefore affirm the Court of
Appeals decision and the judgment of the district court.
Background and District Court Proceedings
facts and district court litigation underlying this appeal
are described completely and effectively in the Court of
Appeals decision, and we incorporate that recitation:
"At about 3:30 a.m. on October 18, 2009, in Riley
County, Matthew Willmore was driving his father's 1998
Ford F-150 pickup north on K-177, which is a four-lane
highway separated by a grassy median. Less than a mile north
of Interstate 70, Willmore fell asleep at the wheel and
rolled the pickup across the median. The truck eventually
came to a stop on its wheels, blocking the southbound lanes
of the highway. Willmore- who was 18 years old at the time of
the accident-had drunk several beers at a friend's house
earlier that night.
"David McGillis, who was also driving north, witnessed
the accident and stopped to assist Willmore. After Willmore
exited the pickup truck, he walked to the median where he
spoke with McGillis. Willmore then attempted to move the
truck but found that it would not start. Although it was dark
outside and there were no lights illuminating the highway,
Willmore turned off the truck's headlights. He called his
parents to inform them of the accident and then began picking
up debris from the highway.
"In response to a 911 call from McGillis, a dispatcher
for the Riley County Police Department (RCPD) advised
officers Juan Apodaca and Jonathan Dulaney-who were
patrolling together-about the traffic accident. The
dispatcher told the officers that the location of the
accident was north of Interstate 70 on K-177 and that the
vehicle involved in the accident was in the southbound lanes
of the highway. Officer Apodaca acknowledged to the
dispatcher that the accident was north of Interstate 70. The
dispatcher also informed the officers that nobody was injured
in the accident.
"Officer Apodaca drove to the accident scene-with
Officer Dulaney in the passenger seat-at a high rate of speed
with his emergency lights and sirens activated. Officer
Apodaca saw the headlights and flashers from McGillis'
vehicle-that was parked on the center-edge of the northbound
lanes-from over a mile away, and he believed it was the scene
of the accident. Officer Apodaca did not see the disabled
pickup in the southbound lanes and struck it while travelling
104 mph. The second accident occurred at 3:42 a.m.
"Around 6 a.m., an evidentiary breath test revealed that
Willmore's breath alcohol content was .103. During an
interview conducted by a RCPD investigator about 5 months
after the accident, Officer Apodaca acknowledged that the
dispatcher had told him that the accident was north of
Interstate 70 and that the truck was blocking the southbound
lanes. But the officer stated that for some reason he
envisioned the accident scene being south of Interstate 70.
Officer Apodaca did not recall the dispatcher telling him
that no one was injured in the accident. Instead, Officer
Apodaca stated that he was driving at a high rate of speed
because he believed someone may have been injured.
"As a result of the accident, both Officer Apodaca and
Officer Dulaney suffered serious injuries. They applied for
and received workers' compensation benefits. On October
17, 2011, the officers filed a joint petition in Shawnee
County District Court, alleging that Willmore's
negligence caused them to suffer personal injuries and
related damages. The officers also asserted a claim of
negligent entrustment against Willmore's father. A few
months later, Oak River Insurance Company-the liability
carrier for the RCPD-intervened as a party to the lawsuit.
"On March 22, 2013, Officer Apodaca, Officer Dulaney,
and Oak River Insurance Company filed a motion for partial
summary judgment concerning the Willmores' claims of
comparative fault. One week later, the Willmores also filed a
motion for summary judgment. Among other things, the
Willmores argued that the firefighter's rule barred all
the officers' claims. Shortly thereafter, Officer Dulaney
dismissed his claims against the Willmores.
"On March 13, 2014, the district court entered a
memorandum decision and order denying the motion for partial
summary judgment filed by Officer Apodaca and Oak River
Insurance Company but granting summary judgment in favor of
the Willmores. In its decision, the district court found that
the '[firefighter's] rule should be and is extended
to law enforcement officers.' Accordingly, it concluded
that the firefighter's rule barred Officer Apodaca from
recovering in this negligence action because he was acting
within the scope of his duties as a law enforcement officer
at the time of the accident.
"Officer Apodaca filed a motion for reconsideration and,
for the first time, asserted that Willmore's actions in
causing the initial accident were willful, wanton, reckless,
or intentional. In an order entered on May 27, 2014, the
district court denied Officer Apodaca's motion,
concluding 'that the grounds for judgment under K.S.A.
60-259(f) are not presented' and that there 'has been
no intervening change in the controlling law, no new evidence
which was previously unavailable and there is no manifest
injustice to correct.' Moreover, the district court found
that the arguments presented in the motion were either
'an attempt to revisit issues already addressed or
advance arguments that could have been raised in prior
briefing.'" Apodaca v. Willmore, 51
Kan.App.2d 534, 535-37, 349 P.3d 481 (2015).
remaining plaintiff, Apodaca, appealed to the Court of
Appeals, and Judge David E. Bruns wrote for a unanimous panel
of the Court of Appeals, affirming the district court. We
accepted this case on petition for review.
with a recitation of the familiar standard of review for
summary judgment decisions.
"When the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law, summary judgment is appropriate.
The district court is required to resolve all facts and
inferences that may reasonably be drawn from the evidence in
favor of the party against whom the ruling is sought. When
opposing a motion for summary judgment, an adverse party must
come forward with evidence to establish a dispute as to a
material fact. In order to preclude summary judgment, the
facts subject to the dispute must be material to the
conclusive issues in the case. On appeal, we apply the same
rules as the district court." Apodaca, 51
Kan.App.2d at 538 (citing Stanley Bank v. Parish,
298 Kan. 755, 759, 317 P.3d 750');">317 P.3d 750 ).
Court of Appeals acknowledged, summary judgments should be
granted with caution in negligence cases. See Fettke v.
City of Wichita, 264 Kan. 629, 632, 957 P.2d 409 (1998).
An exception to that general rule applies when the only
question presented is one of law. See Honeycutt v. City
of Wichita, 251 Kan. 451, Syl. ¶ 8, 836 P.2d 1128
(1992) ("In a negligence action, summary judgment is
proper if the only questions presented are questions of
law."); see also KNEA v. State, 305 Kan. 739,
748, 387 P.3d 795 (2017) (when reviewing pure question of
law, "'no additional facts need to arise or be
developed in the record'"). And the issue of whether
the firefighter's rule should be extended to law
enforcement officers is such a question. Questions of law are
reviewable de novo on appeal. See Martin v. Naik,
297 Kan. 241, 245, 300 P.3d 625 (2013) (citing Thomas v.
Board of Shawnee County Comm'rs, 293 Kan. 208,
220-21, 262 P.3d 336');">262 P.3d 336 ).
Context of the Firefighter's Rule
firefighter's rule prevents an injured firefighter from
recovering when his or her injury was caused by the wrong
that initially required his or her presence in an official
capacity at the scene. It "prohibits firefighters from
suing the person who was negligently responsible for causing
the fire or other hazard for injuries they suffer in
responding to and quelling that hazard, subject to several
exceptions." Apodaca, 51 Kan.App.2d at 538. In
order to determine whether the rule should be extended to law
enforcement officers such as the plaintiff in this case, we
must first examine the legal context of the rule.
suing to recover for a tortfeasor's negligence must prove
the existence of a duty, a breach of that duty, an injury,
and proximate cause. D.W. v. Bliss, 279 Kan. 726,
Syl. ¶ 1, 112 P.3d 232 (2005). Proximate cause is
"that cause which '"in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by an efficient intervening cause,
produces the injury and without which the injury would not
have occurred, the injury being the natural and probable
consequence of the wrongful act."'" Yount
v. Deibert, 282 Kan. 619, 624-25, 147 P.3d 1065 (2006).
In determining whether an injury is "the natural and
probable consequence of the wrongful act, " the Court of
Appeals has stated that "'[a] defendant is not
responsible for all possible consequences of his or
her negligence, only those consequences which are
probable according to ordinary and usual
experience.''' Hale v. Brown, 38
Kan.App.2d 495, 496, 167 P.3d 362 (2007).
an injured "rescuer" has been able to recover
damages from a person whose negligence created the need for
the rescue. See Brock, Administrator v. Peabody
Cooperative Equity Exchange, 186 Kan. 657, Syl. ¶
1, 352 P.2d 37 (1960) (not contributory negligence for person
to risk life or place in great danger in effort to save
another); see also Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability
for Physical and Emotional Harm § 32 (2010) ("if an
actor's tortious conduct imperils another or the property
of another, the scope of the actor's liability includes
any harm to a person resulting from that person's efforts
to aid or to protect the imperiled person or property").
This rescue doctrine treats a potential rescuer as among the
class of persons to whom a tortfeasor owes a duty as a matter
of law. The rescue and rescuer are considered foreseeable,
and the initial negligent act is considered the proximate
cause of any injury sustained by the rescuer during the
course of the rescue.
jurisdictions have adopted the firefighter's rule as an
exception to the rescue doctrine. See, e.g.,
Baldonado v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 143 N.M. 297,
301-02, 176 P.3d 286 (Ct. App. 2006) (firefighter's rule
evolved as exception to rescue doctrine; rescuer who could
otherwise recover cannot do so if performing duties as
professional firefighter). In some jurisdictions, the rule is
known as the "professional rescuer's doctrine."
origins of the firefighter's rule can be traced to
Gibson v. Leonard, 143 Ill. 182, 32 N.E. 182 (1892),
overruled in part by Dini v. Naiditch, 20 Ill.2d
406, 170 N.E.2d 881 (1960). In that case, the Illinois
Supreme Court applied the general categories of premises
liability and held that firefighters are mere licensees. 143
Ill. at 190. Because firefighters are licensees, an owner has
no obligation "to provide against the dangers of
accident." 143 Ill. at 190.
not until 1985 that this court was called upon to address the
firefighter's rule for the first time. In the 93 years
since the rule's inception in 1892, the doctrinal basis
for its adoption and continued vitality had shifted.
Traditional premises liability categories had begun to fall
out of favor. See Britt v. Allen County Community Jr.
College, 230 Kan. 502, 505-07, 638 P.2d 914 (1982)
(discussing trend of jurisdictions abolishing traditional
common-law premises liability categorizations; declining to
abolish doctrine in Kansas), overruled by Jones v.
Hanson, 254 Kan. 499, Syl. ¶ 1, 867 P.2d 303 (1994)
(abolishing traditional premises liability categories in
Kansas). And assumption of risk, see Fletcher v. Illinois
Central Gulf Railroad Co., 679 S.W.2d 240, 243 (Ky. App.
1984) (firefighter "must be deemed to have assumed the
personal risks inherent in dealing with the emergency which
necessitated his presence"); Krauth v. Geller,
31 N.J. 270, 273-74, 157 A.2d 129');">157 A.2d 129 (1960) (firefighter
"cannot complain of negligence in the creation of the
very occasion for his engagement"), had lost some of its
persuasive force as increasing numbers of jurisdictions
adopted comparative fault. Thus, when this court ultimately
adopted the firefighter's rule in Calvert, 236
Kan. 570, it grounded its decision on public policy.
Donald Calvert was among the firefighters to respond to an
anhydrous ammonia leak at the Garvey Elevator complex in
Seward. Once on the scene, Calvert attempted to rescue a man
who had collapsed near the leak. Despite wearing a
respirator, Calvert inhaled some of the fumes and suffered a
heart attack as a result.
filed suit against Chevron Chemical, the owner of a storage
tank the anhydrous ammonia had been stored in, and Garvey
Elevators, seeking damages for his injuries. The district
judge determined that the firefighter's rule should bar
recovery because Calvert was discharging his duties as a
firefighter at the time of his injury.
this court addressed the rule on appeal, it began its
analysis by reciting its typical formulation: "[A] fire
fighter who enters upon the premises of another in the
discharge of his duty may not maintain a cause of action
against the individual for negligence in creating a risk
which necessitated a fire fighter's presence and resulted
in injury to the fire fighter." 236 Kan. at 572.
court noted that several different legal theories had been
used to support the rule but that most jurisdictions had
adopted some form of it. 236 Kan. at 572. The court surveyed
four specific legal bases cited by others: premises
liability, assumption of the risk, employment-based
assumption of the risk, and public policy.
premises liability, the court observed that some
jurisdictions had categorized firefighters as a
"licensee." 236 Kan. at 572-73 (citing Price v.
Morgan, 436 So.2d 1116');">436 So.2d 1116 [Fla. Dist. App. 1983];
Buchanan v. Prickett & Son, Inc., 203 Neb. 684,
279 N.W.2d 855');">279 N.W.2d 855 ; Baxley v. Williams Construction
Co., 98 Ga.App. 662, 106 S.E.2d 799');">106 S.E.2d 799 ). In Kansas,
a "licensee" was "one who enters or remains on
the premises of another by virtue of either the express or
implied consent of the possessor of the premises, " and
the only duty owed by an owner or occupant of land to a
licensee was "to refrain from injuring the licensee
willfully or wantonly." Calvert, 236 Kan. at
jurisdictions had rejected licensee status for firefighters
and instead determined that they were "invitees."
236 Kan. at 573 (citing Fancil v. Q.S.E. Foods,
Inc., 60 Ill.2d 552, 328 N.E.2d 538');">328 N.E.2d 538 ; Wash, et
al. v. Madison Park Properties, Ltd., 102 N.J.Super.
134, 245 A.2d 512');">245 A.2d 512 ). An "invitee" was
"one who enters or remains on the premises for the
benefit of the inviter, or for the mutual benefit and
advantage of both the inviter and invitee."
Calvert, 236 Kan. at 573. A property owner or
occupant would owe an invitee a duty of "reasonable or
ordinary care for the invitee's safety" and had the
duty "to protect and warn an invitee of a danger that
may be reasonably anticipated." Calvert, 236
Kan. at 573.
other jurisdictions rejected both licensee and invitee
classifications and instead held firefighters to be sui
generis. 236 Kan. at 573 (citing Krauth v. Israel Geller
and Buckingham Homes, Inc., 31 N.J. 270, 157 A.2d 129');">157 A.2d 129
; Beedenbender v. Midtown Properties, 4 A.D.2d
276, 164 N.Y.S.2d 276');">164 N.Y.S.2d 276 ). "When classified as sui
generis, one of that class is privileged to enter the land
for a public purpose, irrespective of consent."
Calvert, 236 Kan. at 573. The duty owed to such a
person would be similar to that owed to an invitee. 236 Kan.
Calvert court then turned to assumption of the risk,
acknowledging that a number of jurisdictions had relied on
the doctrine in adopting the firefighter's rule. 236 Kan.
at 573-74 (citing Baker v. Superior Court, 129
Cal.App.3d 710, 181 Cal.Rptr. 311');">181 Cal.Rptr. 311 ; Krauth, 31
N.J. 270). "The Fireman's Rule is not based upon
'express' assumption of the risk, i.e.,
where parties contract with each other so that one accepts
the risk of harm which is instant to the other's conduct,
but rather upon 'implied' assumption of the
risk." 236 Kan. at 573-74. Moreover, assumption of risk
can be divided into "primary" and
"secondary" assumption of risk. Primary assumption
of risk "relieves an individual of a duty which he might
otherwise owe another with respect to a particular
risk." 236 Kan. at 574. It is an "an absolute bar
to a fire fighter's recovery; it dictates that the
occupier of the premises did not owe the individual fireman
any duty of care." 236 Kan. at 574; see also
Armstrong v. Mailand, 284 N.W.2d 343, 349-50 (Minn.
1979) (The firefighter's rule "'is not unique to
landowner cases but is applicable to our entire system of
justice[;] one who has knowingly and voluntarily confronted a
hazard cannot recover for injuries sustained
thereby.'"). In contrast, secondary assumption of a
risk "occurs when the individual voluntarily encounters
a known, appreciated risk without an intended manifestation
by that individual that he consents to relieve another of his
duty." Calvert, 236 Kan. at 574. Because of the
then-current state of the doctrine of assumption of the risk
in Kansas, the Calvert court said that adopting it
as the basis for the firefighter's rule would require use
of the secondary form "where a master/servant
relationship is involved." 236 Kan. at 574. "[A]n
individual taxpayer, as occupant of the premises, [would be
regarded as] the employer of the fire fighter employee."
236 Kan. at 574-75. Since Calvert, this court has
abolished the doctrine of assumption of the risk in the
master/servant setting. See Simmons v. Porter, 298
Kan. 299, Syl. ¶ 6, 312 P.3d 345 (2013) (rationale for
retaining assumption of the risk doctrine no longer viable in
Kansas, given statutory comparative fault rules).
Calvert court next considered and rejected
employment-based assumption of the risk as a basis for
adoption of the firefighter's rule. Some jurisdictions
had "determined that a fire fighter is a public safety
officer, and that a public safety officer, by accepting
salary and fringe benefits, assumes the risk normal to
employment." 236 Kan. at 575 (citing Walters v.
Sloan, 20 Cal.3d 199, 142 Cal.Rptr. 152, 571 P.2d 609');">571 P.2d 609
). Under such a theory, firefighters are paid for the
work they perform, and when injury occurs, compensation is
provided. That compensation might be medical and disability
benefits under workers compensation acts or, in some
instances, special benefits provided under public employee
retirement systems. Calvert, 236 Kan. at 575. For
example, the court noted that the Kansas Legislature had
created a Firefighter's Relief Fund to provide monetary
relief for firefighters injured or disabled on the job. 236
Kan. at 575.
the Calvert court cited and followed jurisdictions
that had adopted the firefighter's rule on public policy
"[A] fire fighter cannot recover for injuries caused by
the very situation that initially required his presence in an
official capacity and subjected him to harm. Public policy
precludes recovery against an individual whose negligence
created the very need for the presence of the fire fighter at
the scene in his professional capacity. See Walters v.
Sloan, 20 Cal.3d 199, 142 Cal.Rptr. 152, 571 P.2d 609');">571 P.2d 609
(1977); Grable v. Varela, 115 Ariz. 222, 564 P.2d
911 (App. 1977); Washington v. Atlantic Richfield
Co., 66 Ill.2d 103, 5 Ill.Dec. 143, 361 N.E.2d 282
(1976); Romedy v. Johnston, 193 So.2d 487 (Fla.
Dist. App. 1967); Clark v. Corby, 75 Wis.2d 292, 249
N.W.2d 567 (1977); Buren v. Midwest Industries,
Inc., 380 S.W.2d 96 (Ky. 1964).
"Fire fighters enter on the premises to discharge their
duties. Fire fighters are present upon the premises, not
because of any private duty owed the occupant, but because of
the duty owed to the public as a whole. In populous areas
fire fighters are first concerned with keeping a fire
confined and preventing it from spreading to other
structures, and then with the preservation of the burning
"We now hold that it is a public policy of the State of
Kansas that a fire fighter cannot recover for injuries caused
by the very wrong that initially required his presence in an
official capacity and subjected the fire fighter to harm;
that public policy precludes recovery against an individual
whose negligence created a need for the presence of the fire
fighter at the scene in his professional capacity."
Calvert, 236 Kan. at 575-76.
Calvert court also outlined three exceptions to the
rule. First, a firefighter is not barred "from recovery
for negligence or intentional acts of misconduct by a third
party." 236 Kan. at 576. Second, a firefighter is not
barred from recovery if the individual responsible for the
firefighter's presence engages in a subsequent act of
negligence after the firefighter arrives at the scene. 236
Kan. at 576. Third, a firefighter is not barred from recovery
"if an individual fails to warn of known, hidden dangers
on his premises or for misrepresenting the nature of the
hazard where such misconduct causes the injury to the fire
fighter." 236 Kan. at 576. Ultimately, a firefighter
"only assumes hazards which are known and can be
reasonably anticipated at the site of the fire and are a part
of fire fighting." 236 Kan. at 576.
the newly announced rule to the facts before it, the court
held that Calvert was discharging his duties as a firefighter
when he was injured, and therefore defendants could not be
liable for Calvert's injury. 236 Kan. at 577. The court
explicitly rejected Calvert's argument that the rule
should not apply because ultra-hazardous material-anhydrous
ammonia-was involved. According to the court, part of
Calvert's job was to protect the public in situations
where poisonous gas had escaped. 236 Kan. at 576-77.
the Calvert decision, only one other Kansas Supreme
Court case has addressed the firefighter's rule. In that
case, McKernan v. General Motors Corp., 269 Kan.
131, 3 P.3d 1261 (2000), the court considered whether a
firefighter who had been injured when a car hood strut
exploded while he was attempting to extinguish a car fire
could recover from the automobile manufacturer on a products
liability theory. The court weighed the public policy bases
for the firefighter's rule against the public policy
bases for products liability claims and held that the
manufacturer's negligence had not created the risk that
had necessitated the firefighter's presence; thus
allowing products liability claims would not frustrate the
public policy underlying the firefighter's rule. Rather,
it would "promote the public policy of fixing
responsibility for defective products on the party who
introduces the product to the [marketplace]." 269 Kan.
more aspect of this court's previous application of the
Kansas firefighter's rule bears brief mention: Although
this court has not addressed the applicability of the
firefighter's rule to law enforcement officers,
Calvert itself did not apply the rule to a
traditional firefighting situation. Plaintiff Calvert, a
licensed emergency medical technician, was responding to an
anhydrous ammonia leak rather than a fire, and he was in
charge of the ambulance dispatched to the scene.
of the Firefighter's Rule in Other Jurisdictions
than 30 jurisdictions in the United States have adopted the
firefighter's rule, overwhelmingly by court decision
rather than by statute. See, e.g., Gregory v.
Cott, 59 Cal.4th 996, 1012 n.11, 331 P.3d 179 (2014)
(acknowledging statutory limitations to firefighter's
rule under California law); Pottebaum v. Hinds, 347
N.W.2d 642, 643 (Iowa 1984) (adopting "narrow rule
denying recovery to a firefighter and policeman whenever
their injuries are caused by the very wrong that initially
required the presence of an officer in his official capacity
and subjected him to harm"); Phillips v. Hallmark
Cards, Inc., 722 S.W.2d 86, 89 (Mo. 1986) (declining to
abrogate firefighter's rule in Missouri).
states adopting the rule include those such as Kansas and
Alaska, which have relied on a public policy rationale. See
Calvert, 236 Kan. at 576; Moody v. Delta
Western, Inc., 38 P.3d 1139, 1139-40 (Alaska 2002). As
the Court of Appeals noted in this case, the Supreme Court of
Alaska focused on the nature of the relationship between
firefighters and the public they are sworn to serve.
"[I]n Moody v. Delta Western, Inc., 38 P.3d
1139, 1142 (Alaska 2002), the [c]ourt found that the rule
'reflects sound public policy' because '[t]he
public pays for emergency responses of public safety
officials in the form of salaries and enhanced benefits.
Requiring members of the public to pay for injuries incurred
by officers in such responses asks an individual to pay again
for services the community has collectively
purchased.'" Apodaca, 51 Kan.App.2d at 539.
that have codified the firefighter's rule include
California, Nevada, and New Hampshire. See Cal. Civil Code
§ 1714.9 (firefighters, among others, permitted to bring
action for negligence in course of performing duty only under
enumerated circumstances, such as for conduct occurring after
firefighter arrives at scene); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.139
(same); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 507:8-H (2010)
("Firefighters, emergency medical technicians . . .,
police officers, and other public safety officers shall have
no cause of action for injuries incurred during the
performance of duties incidental to and inherent in the
officer's official engagement ...