United States District Court, D. Kansas, Kansas City Division.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
CARLOS MURGUIA UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
The matter before the court is defendant Marlo Toombs’s Motion to Vacate Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Doc. 98). Toombs essentially alleges two claims of ineffective assistance of counsel: (1) defense counsel in his first trial, Daniel Ross and Ray Sousley, were ineffective for failing to adequately represent him, and (2) defense counsel in his second trial, Melanie Morgan, was ineffective at all stages of the second proceeding-trial, sentencing, and appeal. The government argues Toombs has failed to establish that any of his defense attorneys provided ineffective assistance.
On April 26, 2006, Toombs and co-defendant Arlynda Osborn were indicted on various firearm and drug possession charges in case number 06-CR-20057-CM (“First Indictment”). Toombs was originally represented by the Federal Public Defender’s Office; however, on June 29, 2006, Toombs hired Ross and Sousley to represent him. On August 24, 2007, after multiple continuances throughout the pendency of the case, Toombs fired Ross and Sously and hired Morgan to represent him. Morgan immediately asked to delay the jury trial. She then filed numerous pretrial motions, including a motion to dismiss the indictment based upon a Speedy Trial Act violation, which was denied by this court.
On March 4, 2008, Toombs’s first trial began. The jury convicted him on all counts, and the court sentenced him to thirty-five years of imprisonment. On appeal, Toombs argued that this court’s granting of two “ends-of-justice” continuances violated his right to a speedy trial under both the Speedy Trial Act and the Sixth Amendment. The Tenth Circuit found that two of the continuances violated the Speedy Trial Act, but did not violate the Sixth Amendment. United States v. Toombs, 574 F.3d 1262, 1265 (10th Cir. 2009). Finding a Speedy Trial Act violation, the Tenth Circuit remanded the case to this court to “decide whether to dismiss the indictment with or without prejudice.” Id.
On December 7, 2009, Toombs filed a motion to dismiss the First Indictment with prejudice. In a ruling on that motion, the court determined that the First Indictment should be dismissed without prejudice because (1) the offenses charged were serious; (2) Toombs was primarily responsible for the delay; (3) the government did not intentionally cause the delay, and (4) Toombs failed to show prejudice. United States v. Toombs, No. 06-20057-1, 2010 WL 60219, at *1 (D. Kan. 2010). On January 6, 2010, Toombs was re-indicted on seven drug and gun charges, substantially the same counts on which he previously was indicted and tried (“Second Indictment”).
Following the Second Indictment, the court appointed Morgan to represent Toombs. Morgan moved to dismiss the Second Indictment with prejudice based upon the speedy trial violation that occurred in the prior case. This court denied defendant’s motion. Morgan sought three continuances of the trial before the case was finally presented to a jury. (Docs. 24, 28, 30.) On August 26, 2010, a jury found defendant guilty on six of the seven counts. On August 30, 2011, this court sentenced Toombs to a total term of thirty years’ imprisonment. On September 12, 2011, Toombs appealed, raising only two issues-that the court erred in the admission of his testimony from the first jury trial and that the court had abused its discretion is dismissing the indictment without prejudice. On May 20, 2013, the Tenth Circuit denied defendant’s appeal, finding harmless error regarding the admission of Toombs’s prior testimony and finding no error in dismissing Toombs’s first indictment without prejudice. United States v. Toombs, 713 F.3d 1273, 1279 (10th Cir. 2013).
II. Legal Standard
The Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to effective assistance of counsel in criminal prosecutions. See Thomas v. Gibson, 218 F.3d 1213, 1222 (10th Cir. 2000). The court applies the standard identified in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). See Romano v. Gibson, 278 F.3d 1145, 1151 (10th Cir. 2002). Under Strickland, a defendant bears the burden of satisfying a two-pronged test in order to prevail. First, the defendant must show that his attorney’s “performance was deficient” and “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687–88. Second, the defendant must demonstrate prejudice, which requires a showing that there is “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 694. The court may address the Strickland prongs in any order, but need not address both if the defendant fails to establish one. Boyd v. Ward, 179 F.3d 904, 914 (10th Cir. 1999).
Toombs argues that his defense attorneys at both of his two trials were ineffective, for a variety of reasons. The court begins by noting that his motion is 107 pages in total, including attachments. The argument portion of his motion is repeatedly interrupted by numerous supporting attachments. Substantively, Toombs does not readily identify the errors upon which his claims for ineffective assistance of counsel rest, and he provides no legal authority supporting his claims. The government identifies Toombs’s claims as follows:
1. Ross & Sousley were ineffective for failing to adequately represent him;
2. Morgan was ineffective for failing to succeed on a claim that his speedy trial rights were violated in his first prosecution, such that the case ...