In the Matter of the Marriage of: VEARL E. CRAWFORD, Appellee, and EUGENIA L. CRAWFORD, Appellant
Appeal from Leavenworth District Court; DAN K.WILEY, judge.
BY THE COURT
1. Maintenance settled by a separation agreement which is later incorporated into a divorce decree is not subject to modification by the court except as provided for by the agreement or as subsequently agreed to by the parties.
2. When a court has ordered maintenance, it retains the power to modify future maintenance payments that have not already become due, irrespective of whether the original divorce decree specifically states such retention of jurisdiction.
3. The court may not modify maintenance without the consent of the party liable for the maintenance if it has the effect of increasing or accelerating the liability for the unpaid maintenance beyond what was prescribed in the original decree.
4. If the original divorce decree reserves the power of the court to hear subsequent motions for reinstatement of maintenance and such a motion is filed prior to the expiration of the stated period of time for maintenance payments, the court shall have jurisdiction to hear a motion by the recipient of the maintenance to reinstate the maintenance payments.
5. Reinstatement also means the extension of maintenance beyond the original term provided in the original divorce decree.
6. A district court's retention of the power to modify maintenance in a divorce decree does not amount to the retention of the power to reinstate or extend maintenance beyond the term originally provided.
Gary A. Nelson, of Gary A. Nelson, P.A., of Leavenworth, for appellant.
Amy C. Coppola, of Crow & Associates, of Leavenworth, for appellee.
Before PIERRON, P.J., BUSER and POWELL, JJ.
Eugenia L. Crawford appeals the district court's denial of her motion to reinstate and extend maintenance, arguing the court had jurisdiction to modify maintenance under the terms of the divorce decree and should have ...