PAT HUVAL RESTAURANT & OYSTER BAR, INC., AQUA FARMS CRAWFISH, INC., CATFISH WHOLESALE, INC., CHARLES BERNARD, DBA CHARLES' CRAWFISH PAD, ANDRE LEGER, DBA CHEZ FRANCOIS, JIM FRUGE, DBA FISHERMAN'S COVE, J. BERNARD SEAFOOD PROCESSING, INC., FRENCH'S ENTERPRISES SEAFOOD PEELING PLANT, Plaintiffs SKF USA INC., JTEKT NORTH AMERICA CORPORATION (FORMERLY KNOWN AS KOYO CORPORATION OF U.S.A.), Plaintiffs-Appellants
INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION, UNITED STATES CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, THE TIMKEN COMPANY, MPB CORPORATION, Defendants-Appellees
Appeals from the United States Court of International Trade in Nos. 06-CV-0290, 06-CV-0324, 06-CV-0328, 07-CV-0035, 08-CV-0340, 10-CV-0001, Judge Gregory W. Carman.
HERBERT C. SHELLEY, Steptoe & Johnson, LLP, Washington, DC, argued for plaintiff-appellant SKF USA Inc. Also represented by CHRISTOPHER GENTILE FALCONE.
JOHN M. GURLEY, Arent Fox, LLP, Washington, DC, for plaintiff-appellant JTEKT North America Corporation. Also represented by DIANA DIMITRIUC-QUAIA, NANCY NOONAN.
PATRICK VINCENT GALLAGHER, JR., Office of the General Counsel, United States International Trade Commission, Washington, DC, argued for defendant-appellee International Trade Commission. Also represented by NEAL J. REYNOLDS, JAMES M. LYONS, ROBIN LYNN TURNER, DOMINIC L. BIANCHI.
MARTIN M. TOMLINSON, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, argued for defendant-appellee United States Customs and Border Protection. Also represented by ALEXANDER V. SVERDLOV, JOYCE R. BRANDA, JEANNE E. DAVIDSON, FRANKLIN E. WHITE, JR.; JESSICA MILLER, SUZANNA HARTZELL-BALLARD, Office of Assistant Chief Counsel, United States Customs and Border Protection, Indianapolis, IN.
TERENCE PATRICK STEWART, Stewart & Stewart, Washington, DC, argued for defendants-appellees The Timken Company, MPB Corporation. Also represented by PATRICK JOHN MCDONOUGH, GEERT M. DE PREST.
Before LOURIE, BRYSON, and CHEN, Circuit Judges.
Bryson, Circuit Judge.
This is another in a series of cases challenging the constitutionality of the Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, 19 U.S.C. § 1675c(a) (2000), known as the CDSOA or " the Byrd Amendment." We have previously upheld that statute against challenges based on the First Amendment and the equal protection component
of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. See SKF USA, Inc. v. U.S. Customs & Border Prot., 556 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2009); see also Giorgio Foods, Inc. v. United States, Nos. 2013-1304 et al., slip op. 13-16, 785 F.3d 595, (Fed. Cir. Apr. 24, 2015); Ashley Furniture Indus., Inc. v. United States, 734 F.3d 1306, 1310-12 (Fed. Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 135 S.Ct. 72, 190 L.Ed.2d 35 (2014); PS Chez Sidney, L.L.C. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 684 F.3d 1374, 1380-81 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Today we address a challenge to the statute in which the appellants have asserted that the retroactive application of the Byrd Amendment violates due process. The Court of International Trade rejected that constitutional attack, and we affirm.
In the prior SKF appeal, we described the legislative background of the Byrd Amendment and litigation relating to that amendment in some detail. We therefore summarize that background only briefly here.
The Byrd Amendment provided for the distribution of antidumping duties collected by the United States to " affected domestic producers" of goods that are subject to an antidumping duty order. See 19 U.S.C. § 1675c(b)(1), (d). The statute defined an " affected domestic producer" as a party that either petitioned for an antidumping duty order or was an " interested party in support of the petition." Id. § 1675c(b)(1)(A). The Byrd Amendment was repealed in 2006, Pub. L. 109-171, § 7601(a), 120 Stat. 4, 154 (2006), but the repealing statute provided that any duties paid on goods that entered the United States prior to the date of repeal would continue to be distributed in accordance with the pre-repeal statutory scheme. Id. § 7601(b), 120 Stat. at 154.
The Byrd Amendment provided for antidumping duties to be distributed to parties who supported the corresponding antidumping petitions that resulted in " orders or findings in effect on January 1, 1999, or thereafter." 19 U.S.C. § 1675c(d)(1). Because the Byrd Amendment directed that distributions of antidumping duties be made only to petitioners and those interested parties " in support of the petition," domestic producers who opposed antidumping petitions were not eligible for Byrd Amendment payments. Several ineligible domestic producers challenged the constitutionality of the Byrd Amendment on various grounds, leading to a number of decisions by both the Court of International Trade and this court.
The first challenge to the Byrd Amendment filed in this court was brought by SKF USA, Inc. A series of antidumping petitions had been filed seeking antidumping duty orders on two classes of imported antifriction bearings. SKF opposed the petitions, but the petitions were granted in 1989. When the Byrd Amendment was subsequently enacted in 2000, the Commerce Department distributed the duties collected under those antidumping duty orders to those domestic producers who had supported the petitions. Because SKF had opposed the petitions, the Byrd Amendment rendered SKF ineligible to receive a share of the collected duties. SKF then brought suit in the Court of International Trade, seeking a share of the duties collected under the antidumping duty orders on antifriction bearings for fiscal year 2005.
SKF's principal argument was that the Byrd Amendment impermissibly discriminates among participants in an antidumping investigation in violation of the First Amendment and equal protection principles. SKF prevailed in the Court of International Trade on its equal protection
claim, see 451 F.Supp.2d 1355, 30 Ct. Int'l Trade 1433 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2006), but this court reversed. On appeal, SKF put forward its First Amendment argument as its primary theory for affirmance. We rejected that argument, holding that the Byrd Amendment's provision granting payments only to parties who supported the antidumping petition was not a penalty based on speech, but instead was a constitutionally permissible reward for supporting the enforcement of U.S. antidumping law. SKF USA, Inc. v. U.S. Customs & Border Prot.,556 F.3d 1337, 1355-60 (Fed. Cir. 2009). We also rejected SKF's secondary argument that the Byrd Amendment denied it the equal protection of the laws, holding that the statute served a substantial ...