United States District Court, D. Kansas
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
DANIEL D. CRABTREE, District Judge.
Defendant Martye Madkins has filed a motion seeking release from pretrial detention (Doc. 557). His motion argues that two "ends-of-justice" continuances the Court ordered were deficient and thus failed to exclude certain time from the 90-day limit for pretrial detention under 18 U.S.C. § 3164(b). Accounting for this improperly excluded time, Mr. Madkins asserts, his pretrial detention has exceeded 90 days, and therefore the Court must order his immediate release. He also argues that his prolonged detention violates the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Defendant Albert Banks has filed his own motion for release (Doc. 564), which seeks to adopt Mr. Madkins' arguments. The government has filed responses opposing each defendants' motion (Doc. 582, 587). For the reasons explained below, the Court denies Mr. Madkins' and Mr. Banks' motions for release.
A. Defendant's Motion Under § 3164(b)
Mr. Madkins' argument under 18 U.S.C. § 3164(b) turns on whether the two ends-of-justice continuances the Court ordered-on June 24, 2013 (Doc. 70, the "June 24 Continuance"), and January 6, 2014 (Doc. 249, the "January 6 Continuance")-were sufficient to stop Mr. Madkins' 90-day pretrial detention clock. If they were, Mr. Madkins concedes, his pretrial detention has not exceeded 90 non-excludable days, and his motion must be denied.
1. "Ends-of-Justice" Continuances Under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A)
Under § 3164(b), time that is excludable for purposes of a defendant's speedy trial clock also is excludable against a defendant's 90-day pretrial detention clock. 18 U.S.C. § 3164(b) ("[P]eriods of delay enumerated in section 3161(h) are excluded in computing the time limitation specified in this section...."). As pertinent here, such excludable time includes:
Any period of delay resulting from a continuance granted by any judge on his own motion or at the request of the defendant or his counsel or at the request of the attorney for the Government, if the judge granted such continuance on the basis of his findings that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A). These delays only qualify as excludable time, however, if the court granting an ends-of-justice continuance "sets forth, in the record of the case, either orally or in writing, its reasons for finding that the ends of justice served by the granting of such continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial." Id. Specifically, a court must identify in the record its analysis of the following factors:
(i) Whether the failure to grant such a continuance in the proceeding would be likely to make a continuation of such proceeding impossible, or result in a miscarriage of justice.
(ii) Whether the case is so unusual or so complex, due to the number of defendants, the nature of the prosecution, or the existence of novel questions of fact or law, that it is unreasonable to expect adequate preparation for pretrial proceedings or for the trial itself within the time limits established by this section.
(iii) Whether, in a case in which arrest precedes indictment, delay in the filing of the indictment is caused because the arrest occurs at a time such that it is unreasonable to expect return and filing of the indictment within the period specified in section 3161(b), or because the facts upon which the grand jury must base its determination are unusual or complex.
(iv) Whether the failure to grant such a continuance in a case which, taken as a whole, is not so unusual or so complex as to fall within clause (ii), would deny the defendant reasonable time to obtain counsel, would unreasonably deny the defendant or the Government continuity of counsel, or would deny counsel for the defendant or the attorney for the Government the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(B)(i)-(iv).
As the Tenth Circuit has emphasized, the requirement that courts make on the record findings about the circumstances warranting a continuance is an important one. See United States v. Toombs, 574 F.3d 1262, 1269 (10th Cir. 2009). In Toombs, the Circuit reminded district courts that the "[ends-of-justice] exception to the otherwise precise requirements of the [Speedy Trial] Act was meant to be a rarely used tool for those cases demanding more flexible treatment.'" Id. (quoting United States v. Doran, 882 F.2d 1511, 1515 (10th Cir. 1989)). The statute requires clear and on the record findings for two reasons-"[i]t both ensures the district court considers the relevant factors and provides [appellate courts] with an adequate record to review." Id. (citing Doran, 882 F.2d at 1515). A court's failure to identify its reasons for granting an ends-of-justice continuance "creates the unnecessary risk of granting continuances for the wrong purposes, and encourages overuse of this narrow exception.'" Id. (quoting Doran, 882 F.2d at 1515). Mr. Madkins argues that the ...