Appeal from Douglas District Court; SALLY D. POKORNY, judge.
BY THE COURT
1. Interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which appellate courts have unlimited review.
2. The most fundamental rule of statutory interpretation is that the intent of the legislature governs if that intent can be ascertained.
3. In uncovering legislative intent, an appellate court must first examine the statutory language enacted and give common words their ordinary meanings.
4. Where there is no ambiguity in the statutory language, the court need not resort to statutory construction. Only if the statute's language or text is unclear or ambiguous does the court use canons of construction or legislative history to construe the legislature's intent.
5. Unless the context indicates that words are to be given a technical meaning, words are to be understood in their ordinary, everyday meanings.
6. The ordinary, everyday meaning of the word " invitee" is " one who is invited."
7. There is no indication either by its context or the legislative history that the legislature intended to give the term " invitee" as used in K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 21-5608 the narrow and technical definition used in the field of tort law.
Patrick J. Hurley, assistant district attorney, Charles E. Branson, district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellant.
Adam M. Hall, of Collister & Kampshroeder, of Lawrence, for appellee.
Before LEBEN, P.J., ARNOLD-BURGER, J., and DANIEL L. LOVE, District Judge, assigned.