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Gatewood v. Colvin

United States District Court, D. Kansas

September 30, 2014

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.


SAM A. CROW, Senior District Judge.

This is an action reviewing the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying the plaintiff disability insurance benefits. The matter has been fully briefed by the parties.

I. General legal standards

The court's standard of review is set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), which provides that "the findings of the Commissioner as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive." The court should review the Commissioner's decision to determine only whether the decision was supported by substantial evidence and whether the Commissioner applied the correct legal standards. Glenn v. Shalala , 21 F.3d 983, 984 (10th Cir. 1994). Substantial evidence requires more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance, and is satisfied by such evidence that a reasonable mind might accept to support the conclusion. The determination of whether substantial evidence supports the Commissioner's decision is not simply a quantitative exercise, for evidence is not substantial if it is overwhelmed by other evidence or if it really constitutes mere conclusion. Ray v. Bowen , 865 F.2d 222, 224 (10th Cir. 1989). Although the court is not to reweigh the evidence, the findings of the Commissioner will not be mechanically accepted. Nor will the findings be affirmed by isolating facts and labeling them substantial evidence, as the court must scrutinize the entire record in determining whether the Commissioner's conclusions are rational. Graham v. Sullivan , 794 F.Supp. 1045, 1047 (D. Kan. 1992). The court should examine the record as a whole, including whatever in the record fairly detracts from the weight of the Commissioner's decision and, on that basis, determine if the substantiality of the evidence test has been met. Glenn , 21 F.3d at 984.

The Social Security Act provides that an individual shall be determined to be under a disability only if the claimant can establish that they have a physical or mental impairment expected to result in death or last for a continuous period of twelve months which prevents the claimant from engaging in substantial gainful activity (SGA). The claimant's physical or mental impairment or impairments must be of such severity that they are not only unable to perform their previous work but cannot, considering their age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d).

The Commissioner has established a five-step sequential evaluation process to determine disability. If at any step a finding of disability or non-disability can be made, the Commissioner will not review the claim further. At step one, the agency will find non-disability unless the claimant can show that he or she is not working at a "substantial gainful activity." At step two, the agency will find non-disability unless the claimant shows that he or she has a "severe impairment, " which is defined as any "impairment or combination of impairments which significantly limits [the claimant's] physical or mental ability to do basic work activities." At step three, the agency determines whether the impairment which enabled the claimant to survive step two is on the list of impairments presumed severe enough to render one disabled. If the claimant's impairment does not meet or equal a listed impairment, the inquiry proceeds to step four, at which the agency assesses whether the claimant can do his or her previous work; unless the claimant shows that he or she cannot perform their previous work, they are determined not to be disabled. If the claimant survives step four, the fifth and final step requires the agency to consider vocational factors (the claimant's age, education, and past work experience) and to determine whether the claimant is capable of performing other jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy. Barnhart v. Thomas , 124 S.Ct. 376, 379-380 (2003).

The claimant bears the burden of proof through step four of the analysis. Nielson v. Sullivan , 992 F.2d 1118, 1120 (10th Cir. 1993). At step five, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show that the claimant can perform other work that exists in the national economy. Nielson , 992 F.2d at 1120; Thompson v. Sullivan , 987 F.2d 1482, 1487 (10th Cir. 1993). The Commissioner meets this burden if the decision is supported by substantial evidence. Thompson , 987 F.2d at 1487.

Before going from step three to step four, the agency will assess the claimant's residual functional capacity (RFC). This RFC assessment is used to evaluate the claim at both step four and step five. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 404.1520(e, f, g); 416.920(a)(4), 416.920(e, f, g).

II. History of case

On May 11, 2012, administrative law judge (ALJ) John B. Langland issued his decision (R. at 20-29). Plaintiff alleges that she had been disabled since June 12, 2009 (R. at 20). Plaintiff meets the insured status requirements for social security disability benefits through December 31, 2014 (R. at 22). At step one, the ALJ found that plaintiff did not engage in substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset date (R. at 22). At step two, the ALJ found that plaintiff had the following severe impairments: history of carpal tunnel syndrome (status post bilateral release surgery), sleep apnea, hypertension, chronic heart failure, history of angina, fibromyalgia, an affective disorder, and recent anxiety diagnosis (R. at 22). At step three, the ALJ determined that plaintiff's impairments do not meet or equal a listed impairment (R. at 22). After determining plaintiff's RFC (R. at 24), the ALJ determined at step four that plaintiff is unable to perform past relevant work (R. at 28). At step five, the ALJ found that plaintiff can perform jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy (R. at 28-29). Therefore, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff was not disabled (R. at 29).

III. Should this case be remanded in order for the Commissioner to consider new evidence?

42 U.S.C. § 405(g), as it pertains to remands, states in sentence six that "[t]he court...may at any time order additional evidence to be taken before the Commissioner of Social Security, but only upon a showing that there is new evidence which is material and that there is good cause for the failure to incorporate such evidence into the record in a prior proceeding...". The requirements for a sentence six remand are set forth in Heimerman v. Chater , 939 Fed. Supp. 832, 833-834 (D. Kan. 1996):

For a remand to be appropriate when good cause is shown, it must be determined "that the new evidence would have changed the Secretary's decision had it been before him." Hargis v. Sullivan , 945 F.2d 1482, 1493 (10th Cir.1991). Implicit in the materiality requirement is that "the proffered evidence relate to the time period for which the benefits were denied." Hargis v. Sullivan , 945 F.2d 1482, 1493 (10th Cir.1991). See also Szubak v. Secretary of Health and Human Services , 745 F.2d 831, 833 (3rd Cir.1984) (new evidence may not relate to a "later-acquired disability" or "the subsequent deterioration of the previously non-disabling condition"). The requirements for introduction of additional evidence may be summarized as follows: (1) the proffered evidence must be "new'" and not merely cumulative of what is already in the record; (2) the proffered evidence must be material, that is, relating to the time period for which benefits were denied, and offering a reasonable possibility of changing the Secretary's decision; and (3) the claimant must show good cause for the failure to obtain and present the evidence at the prior hearing. Tirado v. Bowen , 842 F.2d 595, 597 (2nd Cir.1988).

On February 8, 2011, plaintiff's treating physician, Dr. Davis, prepared a physical capacities evaluation on the plaintiff. He opined that plaintiff could frequently lift 5 pounds, could occasionally lift up to 10 pounds, and could never climb, balance, crouch or crawl. He stated that plaintiff suffers from fatigue and pain for which there is a reasonable medical basis, and indicated that the fatigue and pain are disabling to ...

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