United States District Court, D. Kansas
ANGELA K. KELLEY, Plaintiff,
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
SAM A. CROW, Senior District Judge.
This is an action reviewing the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security which denied plaintiff disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income payments. The matter has been fully briefed by the parties.
I. General legal standards
The court's standard of review is set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), which provides that "the findings of the Commissioner as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive." The court should review the Commissioner's decision to determine only whether the decision was supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole, and whether the Commissioner applied the correct legal standards. Glenn v. Shalala, 21 F.3d 983, 984 (10th Cir. 1994). When supported by substantial evidence, the Commissioner's findings are conclusive and must be affirmed. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971).
Substantial evidence requires more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance, and is satisfied by such evidence that a reasonable mind might accept to support the conclusion. Hackett v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1168, 1172 (10th Cir. 2005). The determination of whether substantial evidence supports the Commissioner's decision is not simply a quantitative exercise, for evidence is not substantial if it is overwhelmed by other evidence or if it really constitutes mere conclusion. Ray v. Bowen, 865 F.2d 222, 224 (10th Cir. 1989). But the standard "does not allow a court to displace the agency's choice between two fairly conflicting views, even though the court would justifiably have made a different choice had the matter been before it de novo. " Trimmer v. Dep't of Labor, 174 F.3d 1098, 1102 (10th Cir. 1999).
The claimant shall be determined to be under a disability only if he can establish that he has a physical or mental impairment expected to result in death or last for a continuous period of twelve months which prevents him from engaging in substantial gainful activity (SGA). The claimant's physical or mental impairment or impairments must be of such severity that he is not only unable to perform his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d).
The Commissioner has established a five-step sequential evaluation process to determine disability. If at any step a finding of disability or non-disability can be made, the Commissioner will not review the claim further. At step one, the agency will find non-disability unless the claimant can show that she is not working at a "substantial gainful activity." At step two, the agency will find non-disability unless the claimant shows that she has a "severe impairment, " which is defined as any "impairment or combination of impairments which significantly limits [the claimant's] physical or mental ability to do basic work activities." At step three, the agency determines whether the impairment which enabled the claimant to survive step two is on the list of impairments presumed severe enough to render one disabled. If the claimant's impairment does not meet or equal a listed impairment, the inquiry proceeds to step four, at which the agency assesses whether the claimant can do her previous work. The claimant is determined not to be disabled unless she shows she cannot perform her previous work. The fifth step requires the agency to consider vocational factors (the claimant's age, education, and past work experience) and to determine whether the claimant is capable of performing other jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy. Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20 (2003).
The claimant bears the burden of proof through step four of the analysis. Nielson v. Sullivan, 992 F.2d 1118, 1120 (10th Cir. 1993). At step five, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show that the claimant can perform other work that exists in the national economy. Nielson, 992 F.2d at 1120; Thompson v. Sullivan, 987 F.2d 1482, 1487 (10th Cir. 1993). The Commissioner meets this burden if the decision is supported by substantial evidence. Thompson, 987 F.2d at 1487.
II. Procedural History
Plaintiff filed applications for disability insurance benefits and SSI alleging that at age 34 she became disabled due to fibromyalgia, chronic fatigue syndrome, and depression. At step one, the administrative law judge (ALJ) found that plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since June 26, 2009, her alleged onset date. The ALJ found at step two that the plaintiff has severe impairments of degenerative joint disease of the cervical spine, fibromyalgia, dysthymia, and anxiety, but found at step three that those impairments did not meet or equal the severity of a listed impairment presumed severe enough to render one disabled.
Accordingly, the ALJ determined plaintiff's residual functional capacity (RFC) as follows:
light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) with the ability to lift 20 pounds occasionally, 10 pounds frequently, sit 6 hours, stand 6 hours, and walk 6 hours in an 8 hour workday, never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds, occasionally climb ramps or stairs, stoop, crouch, kneel, and crawl; avoid concentrated exposure to extreme cold, excessive vibration, hazardous machinery, and unprotected heights; unskilled work only with no more than occasional contact with the general public and co-workers.
Tr. 15. At step four, the ALJ found the plaintiff unable to perform her past relevant work, but found at step five that Plaintiff could perform other jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy, including folding machine operator, collator operator, and inserting machine operator. The ALJ thus determined Plaintiff is not disabled.
Plaintiff primarily challenges the ALJ's ...