Appeal from Douglas District Court; PAULA B. MARTIN, judge.
1. When the material facts involved in a suppression motion are undisputed, an appellate court has unlimited review over the legal question of whether suppression is warranted. An appellate court has unlimited review over the interpretation and interaction of statutes. When a statute is not ambiguous, courts need not resort to statutory construction. Only if a statute's language is unclear or ambiguous do courts resort to the canons of construction or legislative history to determine legislative intent.
2. The most fundamental rule of statutory construction is the intent of the legislature governs if that intent can be ascertained. Courts must first attempt to ascertain legislative intent through statutory language enacted, giving common words their ordinary meaning. In so doing, courts must consider various provisions of an act as a whole with a view to reconciling and bringing the provisions into workable harmony, if possible. Courts must construe statutes to avoid unreasonable or absurd results. Courts presume the legislature does not intend to enact meaningless legislation. When the legislature revises an existing law, courts presume the legislature intended to change the law as it existed prior to the amendment and acted with full knowledge of the existing law. Under the rule of lenity, criminal statutes are generally construed strictly in favor of the accused. This rule is constrained by the principle that the interpretation of a statute must be reasonable and sensible to affect the legislative design and intent of the law. The rule of lenity arises only when there is a reasonable doubt as to a statute's meaning.
3. When there is a conflict between two statutes the latest legislative expression generally controls. But when the conflict is between a general principle of law and a more specific enactment, the more specific statute controls.
4. When considering K.S.A. 22-2503 and K.S.A. 22-2505 together, two statutes enacted at the same time K.S.A. 62-1830 (Corrick 1964) was repealed, the legislature's intent is clear: district magistrates may no longer issue search warrants outside their home judicial district, but district judges can.
5. The procedural safeguards of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), do not apply to the calculation of a defendant's criminal history score for sentencing purposes.
Lydia Krebs, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, for appellant.
Patrick Hurley and Jim McCabria, assistant district attorneys, Charles E. Branson, district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellee.
Before MCANANY, P.J., STANDRIDGE and STEGALL, JJ.
[50 Kan.App.2d 124] Mikael Dwayne Englund appeals from his convictions of aggravated burglary and two counts of aggravated robbery, arguing that incriminating evidence obtained in a search of his home and his subsequent confession should have been suppressed and not admitted as evidence at his trial. Englund also argues that his sentence violates Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000).
The Lawrence police were investigating two separate robberies that took place at an apartment in Douglas County. Englund lived in Franklin County. Englund became a suspect, so in May 2011 the police obtained a search warrant from a district judge in Douglas County to search Englund's Franklin County residence. The search yielded incriminating evidence, and Englund was charged in Douglas County with a number of crimes.
Englund filed a pretrial motion to suppress the evidence found during the search of his Franklin County residence and his later confession and other incriminating evidence that were the products of the search. Englund argued the evidence obtained as a result of the search warrant, including Englund's eventual confession, should be suppressed because the warrant unlawfully authorized a search of a residence outside the territorial jurisdiction of the judge who issued it. See K.S.A. 22-2503.
[50 Kan.App.2d 125] The State argued the territorial restriction on the issuance of search warrants found in K.S.A. 22-2503 applied only to search warrants issued by district magistrate judges, not by district judges.
After the suppression hearing, the district court ruled K.S.A. 22-2503 applied only to district magistrate judges and not to district judges. The court noted that although K.S.A. 22-2202(14) defines " magistrate" as including both district magistrate judges and district court judges, K.S.A. 22-2503 specifically places jurisdictional limits on search warrants issued by a " district magistrate judge." The evidence sought to be suppressed was admitted at trial, and Englund was convicted of aggravated burglary and two counts of aggravated robbery. He appeals, arguing that the evidence obtained as a result of the Douglas County search warrant should have been suppressed.
Englund claims the search warrant was void when issued because the district court judge who signed the warrant had no jurisdiction to issue it for the search of a residence outside of his judicial district under the geographic limits set forth in K.S.A. 22-2503. The State responds that the jurisdictional limits established in K.S.A. 22-2503 explicitly refer only to district magistrate judges, not district judges.
Standards of Review
When, as here, the material facts are not in dispute, we have unlimited review over the legal question of whether suppression is warranted. State v. Martinez, 296 Kan. 482, 485,
293 P.3d 718 (2013). This case also involves the interpretation and interaction of various statutes, matters of law over which our review is unlimited. State v. Dale, 293 Kan. 660, 662, 267 P.3d 743 (2011). When there is no ambiguity, the court need not resort to statutory construction. Only if the statute's language is unclear or ambiguous do we resort to the canons of construction or legislative history to construe the legislature's intent. State v. Urban, 291 Kan. 214, 216, 239 P.3d 837 (2010).
The most fundamental rule of statutory construction is that the intent of the legislature governs if that intent can be ascertained. State v. Arnett, 290 Kan. 41, 47, 223 P.3d 780 (2010). We must [50 Kan.App.2d 126] first attempt to ascertain legislative intent through statutory language enacted, giving common words their ordinary meaning. Urban, 291 Kan. at 216. When construing statutes to determine legislative intent, we must consider various provisions of an act as a whole with a view of reconciling and bringing the provisions into workable harmony if possible. State v. Coman, 294 Kan. 84, 93, 273 P.3d 701 (2012). We must construe statutes to avoid unreasonable or absurd results and presume the legislature does not intend to enact meaningless legislation. State v. Turner, 293 Kan. 1085, 1088, 272 P.3d 19 (2012). In addition, when the legislature revises an existing law, we presume the legislature intended to change the law as it existed prior to the amendment and acted with full knowledge of the existing law. See State v. Snellings, 294 Kan. 149, 157, 273 P.3d 739 (2012); State v. Henning, 289 Kan. 136, 144-45, 209 P.3d 711 (2009). Finally, we are mindful of the rule of lenity, under which criminal statutes are generally construed strictly in favor of the ...