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Buckner v. Colvin

United States District Court, Tenth Circuit

January 3, 2014

VINCENT J. M. BUCKNER, Plaintiff,
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, [1] Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

JOHN W. LUNGSTRUM, District Judge.

Plaintiff seeks review of a decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (hereinafter Commissioner) denying Social Security Disability (SSD) benefits and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits under sections 216(i), 223, 1602, and 1614(a)(3)(A) of the Social Security Act. 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(i), 423, 1381a, and 1382c(a)(3)(A) (hereinafter the Act). Finding error in the Commissioner's application of the legal standard for evaluating credibility, the court ORDERS that the decision shall be REVERSED and that judgment shall be entered pursuant to the fourth sentence of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) REMANDING the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. Background

Plaintiff applied for SSD and SSI, alleging disability beginning October 14, 2009. (R. 21, 149-60). In due course, Plaintiff exhausted proceedings before the Commissioner, and now seeks judicial review of a final decision denying benefits. He alleges errors in evaluating the medical opinions of record, in evaluating the severity of his mental impairments at steps two and three of the Commissioner's five-step sequential evaluation process, and in evaluating the credibility of his allegations of symptoms resulting from his impairments.

The court's review is guided by the Act. Wall v. Astrue , 561 F.3d 1048, 1052 (10th Cir. 2009). Section 405(g) of the Act provides that in judicial review "[t]he findings of the Commissioner as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive." 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The court must determine whether the factual findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record and whether the correct legal standard was applied. Lax v. Astrue , 489 F.3d 1080, 1084 (10th Cir. 2007); accord, White v. Barnhart , 287 F.3d 903, 905 (10th Cir. 2001). Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, but it is less than a preponderance; it is such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion. Richardson v. Perales , 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Wall , 561 F.3d at 1052; Gossett v. Bowen , 862 F.2d 802, 804 (10th Cir. 1988).

The court may "neither reweigh the evidence nor substitute [its] judgment for that of the agency." Bowman v. Astrue , 511 F.3d 1270, 1272 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting Casias v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs. , 933 F.2d 799, 800 (10th Cir. 1991)); accord, Hackett v. Barnhart , 395 F.3d 1168, 1172 (10th Cir. 2005). Nonetheless, the determination whether substantial evidence supports the Commissioner's decision is not simply a quantitative exercise, for evidence is not substantial if it is overwhelmed by other evidence or if it constitutes mere conclusion. Gossett , 862 F.2d at 804-05; Ray v. Bowen , 865 F.2d 222, 224 (10th Cir. 1989).

The Commissioner uses the familiar five-step sequential process to evaluate a claim for disability. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920; Wilson v. Astrue , 602 F.3d 1136, 1139 (10th Cir. 2010) (citing Williams v. Bowen , 844 F.2d 748, 750 (10th Cir. 1988)). "If a determination can be made at any of the steps that a claimant is or is not disabled, evaluation under a subsequent step is not necessary." Wilson , 602 F.3d at 1139 (quoting Lax , 489 F.3d at 1084). In the first three steps, the Commissioner determines whether claimant has engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset, whether he has a severe impairment(s), and whether the severity of his impairment(s) meets or equals the severity of any impairment in the Listing of Impairments (20 C.F.R., Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1). Williams , 844 F.2d at 750-51. After evaluating step three, the Commissioner assesses claimant's residual functional capacity (RFC). 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e). This assessment is used at both step four and step five of the sequential evaluation process. Id.

The Commissioner next evaluates steps four and five of the sequential process- determining at step four whether, in light of the RFC assessed, claimant can perform his past relevant work; and at step five whether, when also considering the vocational factors of age, education, and work experience, claimant is able to perform other work in the economy. Wilson , 602 F.3d at 1139 (quoting Lax , 489 F.3d at 1084). In steps one through four the burden is on Plaintiff to prove a disability that prevents performance of past relevant work. Blea v. Barnhart , 466 F.3d 903, 907 (10th Cir. 2006); accord, Dikeman v. Halter , 245 F.3d 1182, 1184 (10th Cir. 2001); Williams , 844 F.2d at 751 n.2. At step five, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show that there are jobs in the economy which are within the RFC assessed. Id .; Haddock v. Apfel , 196 F.3d 1084, 1088 (10th Cir. 1999).

The court finds that remand is necessary because the administrative law judge (ALJ) erroneously applied the legal standard for evaluating the credibility of Plaintiff's allegations of symptoms. Plaintiff may make further arguments regarding the medical opinions and the severity of his mental impairments in the proceedings on remand.

II. Credibility

Plaintiff's credibility argument asserts that one factor relied upon by the ALJ to discount Plaintiff's credibility actually "makes Plaintiff's claim of disability more believable" (Pl. Br. 38), and that "[a] claimant can still be credible, even if [he] engages in some daily activities." (Pl. Br. 39). These assertions seek merely to have the court reweigh the evidence and substitute its judgment regarding credibility for that of the ALJ, a proposition for which the court is without authority. Bowman , 511 F.3d at 1272; accord, Hackett , 395 F.3d at 1172. Nevertheless, Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ did not "properly consider the third party statements of Plaintiff's mother" (Pl. Br. 39), and erred by relying upon Plaintiff's failure to consistently take his medication without first considering the four factors of the Frey test. (Pl. Br. 40-41) (citing Frey v. Bowen , 816 F.2d 508, 517 (10th Cir. 1987)). In response, the Commissioner argues that "[a]lthough the ALJ did not discuss [Plaintiff's mother's] report, the ALJ implicitly discounted it for the same reasons that the ALJ found Plaintiff's subjective complaints not entirely credible." (Comm'r Br. 16) (citing Brescia v. Astrue , 287 Fed.App'x 626 (10th Cir. 2008)). The Commissioner also argues that the four-factor Frey test is "only applicable when an ALJ denies benefits solely on the ground that a claimant has failed to follow prescribed treatment, " and is not applicable in a case such as this, where an ALJ discusses non-compliance with recommended treatment only when considering credibility. (Comm'r Br. 15) (citing Qualls v. Apfel , 206 F.3d 1368, 1372 (10th Cir. 2000). The court finds that remand is necessary because of error both in failing to consider the third-party report of Plaintiff's mother, and in failing to apply the four-factor Frey test in the circumstances of this case.

A. Application of the Frey Test

Where a claimant has failed or refused to pursue treatment or to take medication, the Tenth Circuit provides a four factor test to determine whether that failure or refusal is justified. That test considers: "(1) whether the treatment at issue would restore claimant's ability to work; (2) whether the treatment was prescribed; (3) whether the treatment was refused; and, if so, (4) whether the refusal was without justifiable excuse." Frey , 816 F.2d at 517. It is this test which Plaintiff argues the Commissioner erroneously failed to apply. The Commissioner, citing Qualls, argues that the Frey test applies only where the Commissioner is attempting to deny benefits "solely on the grounds that a claimant failed to follow prescribed treatment, " and does not apply in a case such as this where the Commissioner is relying on a failure to follow prescribed treatment only to determine whether the claimant's allegations of disabling symptoms are credible. (Comm'r Br. 15). As Plaintiff points out in his reply brief, the Commissioner's argument is foreclosed by Tenth Circuit law. Judge Crow of this court explained in 2002 that the Frey test is applicable both where an ALJ is denying benefits, and where an ALJ is evaluating the credibility of the claimant's allegations. Goodwin v. Barnhart , 195 F.Supp.2d 1293, 1295 (D. Kan. 2002) (citing Thompson v. Sullivan , 987 F.2d 1482, 1490 (10th Cir. 1993); Ragland v. Shalala , 992 F.2d 1056, 1059-60 (10th Cir. 1993)).

The case cited by the Commissioner does not require a different conclusion. The facts in Qualls reveal that Mr. Qualls "took pills his friends gave him, " although he did not know what he was taking, and did not indicate the frequency with which this occurred, and he argued that the Frey test should have been applied in his circumstances. Qualls , 206 F.3d at 1372. The Qualls court found the Frey test inapposite "because Frey concerned the circumstances under which an ...


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