MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
JOHN W. LUNGSTRUM, District Judge.
Plaintiff seeks review of a decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (hereinafter Commissioner) denying Social Security Disability(SSD) benefits under sections 216(i) and 223 of the Social Security Act. 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(i) and 423 (hereinafter the Act). Finding no error in the Commissioner's final decision, the court ORDERS that judgment shall be entered pursuant to the fourth sentence of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) AFFIRMING that decision.
Plaintiff applied for SSD, alleging disability beginning March 13, 2009. (R. 45, 162). In due course, Plaintiff exhausted proceedings before the Commissioner, and now seeks judicial review of the final decision denying benefits. He alleges the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) erred in weighing the medical opinions; in deciding at step three of the sequential evaluation process that Plaintiff's condition does not meet or equal Listing 1.04A; and in failing to address Plaintiff's mental impairments properly or to order a consultative psychological examination, and seeks the court's review of these alleged errors.
The court's review is guided by the Act. Wall v. Astrue , 561 F.3d 1048, 1052 (10th Cir. 2009). Section 405(g) of the Act provides that in judicial review "[t]he findings of the Commissioner as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive." 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The court must determine whether the ALJ's factual findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record and whether he applied the correct legal standard. Lax v. Astrue , 489 F.3d 1080, 1084 (10th Cir. 2007); accord, White v. Barnhart , 287 F.3d 903, 905 (10th Cir. 2001). Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, but it is less than a preponderance; it is such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion. Richardson v. Perales , 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Wall , 561 F.3d at 1052; Gossett v. Bowen , 862 F.2d 802, 804 (10th Cir. 1988).
The court may "neither reweigh the evidence nor substitute [its] judgment for that of the agency." Bowman v. Astrue , 511 F.3d 1270, 1272 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting Casias v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs. , 933 F.2d 799, 800 (10th Cir. 1991)); accord, Hackett v. Barnhart , 395 F.3d 1168, 1172 (10th Cir. 2005). Nonetheless, the determination whether substantial evidence supports the Commissioner's decision is not simply a quantitative exercise, for evidence is not substantial if it is overwhelmed by other evidence or if it constitutes mere conclusion. Gossett , 862 F.2d at 804-05; Ray v. Bowen , 865 F.2d 222, 224 (10th Cir. 1989).
The Commissioner uses the familiar five-step sequential process to evaluate a claim for disability. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920; Wilson v. Astrue , 602 F.3d 1136, 1139 (10th Cir. 2010) (citing Williams v. Bowen , 844 F.2d 748, 750 (10th Cir. 1988)). "If a determination can be made at any of the steps that a claimant is or is not disabled, evaluation under a subsequent step is not necessary." Wilson , 602 F.3d at 1139 (quoting Lax , 489 F.3d at 1084). In the first three steps, the Commissioner determines whether claimant has engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset, whether he has a severe impairment(s), and whether the severity of his impairment(s) meets or equals the severity of any impairment in the Listing of Impairments (20 C.F.R., Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1). Williams , 844 F.2d at 750-51. After evaluating step three, the Commissioner assesses claimant's RFC. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e). This assessment is used at both step four and step five of the sequential evaluation process. Id.
The Commissioner next evaluates steps four and five of the sequential process- determining at step four whether, in light of the RFC assessed, claimant can perform his past relevant work; and at step five whether, when also considering the vocational factors of age, education, and work experience, claimant is able to perform other work in the economy. Wilson , 602 F.3d at 1139 (quoting Lax , 489 F.3d at 1084). In steps one through four the burden is on Plaintiff to prove a disability that prevents performance of past relevant work. Blea v. Barnhart , 466 F.3d 903, 907 (10th Cir. 2006); accord, Dikeman v. Halter , 245 F.3d 1182, 1184 (10th Cir. 2001); Williams , 844 F.2d at 751 n.2. At step five, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show that there are jobs in the economy which are within the RFC assessed. Id .; Haddock v. Apfel , 196 F.3d 1084, 1088 (10th Cir. 1999).
The court addresses Plaintiff's alleged errors in the order they would be reached in applying the Commissioner's sequential evaluation process, and finds no error in the decision at issue.
II. Step Three
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to evaluate properly whether Plaintiff's condition meets or equals the severity of Listing 1.04A. He argues that the ALJ erred by relying upon the fact that counsel at the hearing did not specifically argue that Plaintiff's condition meets or equals a listing; and that the record, in fact, contains evidence that each of the criteria of Listing 1.04A are met, and if the ALJ had addressed those criteria he would have found the Listing met. (Pl. Br. 15-16). He argues that, in any case, "the ALJ made no effort to determine whether [Plaintiff's] condition equaled the Listing 1.04A." (Pl. Br. 17). The Commissioner argues that Plaintiff has not shown that all of the criteria of Listing 1.04A are met because Plaintiff has not shown evidence of nerve root compression during the relevant time-after the surgery on his neck which repaired the nerve root compression. (Comm'r Br. 8). Moreover, she acknowledges that certain criteria may be present intermittently, but that "their presence over a period of time must be established by a record of ongoing management and evaluation." Id. at 9 (citing 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, § 1.00D). With regard to medical equivalence, the Commissioner argues that such a finding requires "medical findings equal in severity to all the criteria for the one most similar listed impairment, " and that "Plaintiff does not even attempt to explain what specific medical findings were equivalent in severity to the criteria of listing 1.04A." Id. at 10-11 (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1526).
A. Standard for Evaluating Step Three and Listing 1.04A
The Commissioner has provided a "Listing of Impairments" which describes certain impairments that she considers disabling. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1525(a); see also, Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 (Listing of Impairments). If a claimant's condition meets or equals the severity of a listed impairment, his impairment is conclusively presumed disabling. Williams , 844 F.2d at 751; see Bowen v. Yuckert , 482 U.S. 137, 141 (1987) (if claimant's impairment "meets or equals one of the listed impairments, the claimant is conclusively presumed to be disabled"). However, plaintiff "has the burden at step three of demonstrating, through medical evidence, that his impairments meet all of the specified medical criteria' contained in a particular listing." Riddle v. Halter, No. 00-7043 , 2001 WL 282344 at *1 (10th Cir. Mar. 22, 2001) (quoting Sullivan v. Zebley , 493 U.S. 521, 530 (1990) (emphasis in Zebley)). "An impairment that manifests only some of [the listing] criteria, no matter how severely, does not qualify" to meet or equal the listing. Zebley , 493 U.S. at 530. Medical equivalence to a listing may be established by showing that the claimant's impairment(s) "is at least equal in severity and duration to the criteria of any listed impairment." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1526(a). The determination of medical equivalence is made without consideration of vocational factors of age, education, or work experience. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1526(c).
"The [Commissioner] explicitly has set the medical criteria defining the listed impairments at a higher level of severity than the statutory standard. The listings define impairments that would prevent an adult, regardless of his age, education, or work experience, from performing any gainful activity, not just substantial gainful activity.'" Zebley , 493 U.S. at 532-33 (emphasis in original) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.925(a) (1989)). The listings "streamlin[e] the decision process by identifying those claimants whose medical impairments are so severe that it is likely they would be found disabled regardless of their vocational background." Yuckert , 482 U.S. at 153. "Because the Listings, if met, operate to cut off further detailed inquiry, they should not be read expansively." Caviness v. Apfel , 4 F.Supp.2d 813, 818 (S.D. Ind. 1998).
As relevant here, Listing 1.04A regards disorders of the spine producing "evidence of nerve root compression:"
1.04 Disorders of the spine (e.g., herniated nucleus pulposus, spinal arachnoiditis, spinal stenosis, osteoarthritis, degenerative disc disease, facet arthritis, vertebral fracture) resulting in compromise of a nerve root (including the cauda equina) or the spinal cord.
A. Evidence of nerve root compression characterized by neuro-anatomic distribution of pain, limitation of motion of the spine, motor loss (atrophy with associated muscle weakness or muscle weakness) accompanied by sensory or reflex loss and, if there is involvement of the lower back, positive straight-leg raising test (sitting and supine);
20 C.F.R., Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1.
As the quotation above reveals, the criteria of Listing 1.04A (nerve root compression) are: (i) neuro-anatomic distribution of pain, (ii) limitation of motion of the spine, (iii) motor loss accompanied by either (a) sensory loss, or (b) reflex loss, and (only if the lower back is ...