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Mid-Century Ins. Co. v. Johnson

United States District Court, Tenth Circuit

June 14, 2013

JEREMIAH JOHNSON, et al., Defendants.


Richard D. Rogers United States District Judge

This matter is presently before the court upon plaintiffs' motion to remand and defendant’s motion for a hearing on plaintiffs' motion. Having carefully reviewed the arguments of the parties, the court is now prepared to rule on both motions.[1]


This is an action for declaratory judgment filed by plaintiffs Mid-Century Insurance Company and Farmers Insurance Exchange (FIE) seeking a declaration that there is no insurance coverage under a homeowner's policy and an umbrella policy issued by plaintiffs to defendant Jeremiah Johnson for claims asserted against him in an underlying lawsuit arising from allegations that he secretly filmed his employees under their desks in his law office. Johnson, a resident of Missouri, is an attorney licensed in the State of Kansas and as a result of his action as alleged in the underlying lawsuit, criminal proceedings and professional disciplinary proceedings have been commenced against him in the State of Kansas. Mid-Century provided a defense to Johnson in the underlying lawsuit with a reservation of rights. The reservation of rights was accepted by Johnson. Johnson settled the underlying claims against him and has demanded that plaintiffs indemnify him for amounts he expended both to settle those claims and amounts he expended on personal counsel. Plaintiffs filed this action in the District Court of Johnson County, Kansas, and Johnson removed the case to this court based upon diversity of citizenship jurisdiction.


In the motion to remand, plaintiffs contend that this court is without subject matter jurisdiction because diversity of citizenship among the parties is lacking. Plaintiffs assert that FIE is a reciprocal insurance exchange which is considered an unincorporated association for the purposes of diversity citizenship. The citizenship of FIE is therefore determined to be each state within which the reciprocal insurance exchange has a subscriber or member. Here, since Johnson is member, that means that FIE is a citizen of Missouri for purposes of this lawsuit. Thus, plaintiffs argue that the court lacks diversity jurisdiction since both Johnson and FIE are citizens of Missouri.

Johnson has countered that FIE should not be permitted to assert it is a citizen of Missouri because FIE has taken “inconsistent” positions concerning its corporate structure and citizenship in other litigation. Johnson points to the following cases for support: Brackney v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 2011 WL 3678822 (W.D.Mo. 2011); Shemwell v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., 2000 WL 33301960 (S.D.Ill. 2000); Chittick v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 844 F.Supp. 1153 (S.D.Tex. 1994); and Truck Ins. Exchange v. Dow Chemical Co., 331 F.Supp. 323 (W.D.Mo. 1971). Johnson next argues that FIE's citizenship is “immaterial” for purposes of diversity jurisdiction because it is not an indispensable party and it has no standing to sue. Johnson asserts that standing is lacking because he has not sought coverage under the umbrella/excess policy that FIE issued.


Federal district courts have original jurisdiction in all civil actions where the amount in controversy exceeds $75, 000 and the adverse parties are “diverse, ” i.e., citizens of different states. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Section 1332(a) requires complete diversity. See Depex Reina 9 P'ship v. Tex. Int'l Petroleum Corp., 897 F.2d 461, 465 (10th Cir. 1990). For purposes of determining a party's citizenship, a natural person is deemed a citizen of the state in which he or she is domiciled, Smith v. Cummings, 445 F.3d 1254, 1260-61 (10th Cir. 2006), a corporation is deemed a citizen of any state in which it is incorporated or has its principal place of business, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1), and an unincorporated association is deemed a citizen of any state in which its “members”are citizens, see Tuck v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 859 F.2d 842, 844-45 (10th Cir.1988).

The nature of reciprocal insurance exchanges was recently explained by the court in James G. Davis Const. Corp. v. Erie Ins. Exchange, 2013 WL 2250152 at *2-3 (D.Md. 2013) as follows:

A reciprocal insurance exchange is an unincorporated association of persons or entities, referred to as “subscribers, ” who exchange risks among themselves. 1 Jeffrey E. Thomas, New Appleman on Insurance Law Library Edition § 1.08[4][e]. The goal of the exchange is for an individual or entity to obtain insurance by entering into a pool of subscribers who all agree to insure one another, subject to certain conditions. Thus, in a reciprocal insurance exchange, “[e]ach subscriber is both an insurer and an insured.” Michael A. Haskel, The Legal Relationship Among A Reciprocal Insurer's Subscribers, Advisory Committee and Attorney-in-Fact, 6 N.Y. City L.Rev. 35 (2003) (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). The subscribers assume liability severally, “meaning that the liability of each member is limited to the premiums paid by that member.” Appleman, supra, § 1.08[4][e]. If a subscriber defaults on his or her premium payments, the other subscribers “cannot be charged with a portion of the liability of the defaulting subscriber.” Id. The association is not operated for profit, but acts “through a person or corporation serving as attorney-in-fact for the organization.” Id. Although the powers of the attorney-in-fact may vary from exchange to exchange, the role is largely administrative. Haskel, supra, at 48-49. . . . . . In a reciprocal insurance exchange, there is no distinction between policyholders (or “customers”) and insurers (or “underwriters”). Indeed, one of the key identifying components of a reciprocal insurance exchange is that all of the policyholders are also providers of insurance to each other (or “subscribers”). Thus, “when a disgruntled policyholder sues the reciprocal, he is suing not so much the entity as he is his fellow individual members of that entity.” Baer v. United Services Automobile Association, 503 F.2d 393, 395 n. 3 (2nd Cir.1974).

Kansas recognizes and authorizes the creation and existence of reciprocal insurance exchanges. See K.S.A. 40-1601 et seq. Reciprocal insurance exchanges are defined in Kansas as follows: “'Reciprocal insurance'” means insurance resulting from the mutual exchange of insurance contracts among persons in an unincorporated association under a common name through an attorney-in-fact having authority to obligate each person both as insured and insurer.” K.S.A. 40-1623(e). Thus, reciprocal insurance exchanges are associations under Kansas law.

The law is well-settled in most jurisdictions, including the Tenth Circuit, that for purposes of diversity jurisdiction, the citizenship of a reciprocal insurance exchange is determined to be each state within which it has a subscriber or member. See Arbuthnot v. State of Automobile Ins. Assoc., 264 F.2d 260, 261-62 (10th Cir. 1959)(rejecting argument that ...

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