Not what you're
looking for? Try an advanced search.
Buy This Entire Record For
IN RE ANDERSON
July 13, 1990.
In the Matter of WAYNE R. ANDERSON, Respondent.
This original proceeding in discipline was filed by
the office of the disciplinary administrator against Wayne R.
Anderson, of Goodland, an attorney admitted to the practice of
law in the State of Kansas. The formal complaint filed against
respondent alleges violations of Model Rules of Professional
Conduct 3.3 (1989 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 238); 8.1 (1989 Kan. Ct. R.
Annot. 266); 8.2 (1989 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 267); and 8.4 (1989
Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 268). Respondent did not file an answer.
A hearing before the panel of the Kansas Board for Discipline
of Attorneys was held on July 12, 1989, in the Harold R. Fatzer
hearing room at the Kansas Judicial Center, Topeka, Kansas.
Respondent appeared pro se. The panel found that, apart from the
accuracy of respondent's public statements, there is no material
dispute as to the facts. The panel noted, however, that
respondent "fervently disagrees" as to the motives and purpose
for his conduct or that his conduct was a violation of the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct.
The panel noted that the complaint against respondent involved
his refusal to obey child custody and support orders of the
district court in Colorado (Case No. 78-DR-0576); the
truthfulness and adequacy of disclosures made relative to
respondent's admission to practice law in Kansas; respondent's
actions relative to the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support
Act (URESA) proceedings; his statements to the press following
his resignation as county counselor; and his incarceration for
failing to comply with the child support order in the URESA
proceedings filed in Sherman
County District Court. The panel then made the following
"3. The evidence is not clear or convincing that
Respondent made false or misleading statements to the
Kansas Board for Admission of Attorneys in 1985
(Exhibits 4 through 7). Respondent's disclosure of
his prior conduct did not prevent a fair or impartial
assessment of his fitness to practice law. Although
later events may well have [led] the Board to reach a
different conclusion, the panel finds that the
evidence fails to support the charge in Paragraph 8
of the Formal Complaint or a violation of MRPC 8.1.
"4. The public statements attributed to Respondent
in Exhibits 10 through 20 are disputed and capable of
various interpretations. Whether Mr. Anderson's
pronouncements were portrayed accurately or
inaccurately, the panel finds that the statements are
insufficient in themselves to support a charge of
conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice
under MRPC 8.4(d). This finding is not intended to
preclude consideration of Respondent's conduct, as
distinguished from his public remarks. On the
contrary, the statements attributed to Respondent
sustain and reinforce the conduct portrayed
throughout the record of this proceeding.
"5. The panel finds that Mr. Anderson's pattern of
behavior is clear and convincing evidence of his
contempt for judicial process and indifference to
legal obligation. We do not question the sincerity of
Respondent's beliefs or his right to advocate his
opinions within the confines of MRPC 3.1. We do find
that Respondent has engaged in a pattern of conduct
best summarized by Judge Delaney in Exhibit 1, Page
"`Mr. Anderson has repeatedly emphasized his
constitutional right to due process of law. He has
consistently avoided any reference to his
obligations under those same laws, nor has he at
any time met such obligations. He has stressed his
parental rights but he has ignored the parental
rights of Willow Cramlet, and, by his conduct
violated her parental rights by removing the child
from her custody and depriving her of any contact
whatsoever for nearly four years. He has violated
the child's rights to a secure home and access to
both parents by his abduction and concealment of
the child for a period in excess of half the
child's life, and he denied the child legal due
process in not allowing the child his day in Court,
to be represented by a [guardian] ad litem, and to
have there determined, legally, what was in the
child's best interest.'
Mr. Anderson remains steadfast in his opinions and in
his freedom to act thereon with impunity under the
MRPC and Rules of the Supreme Court.
"Exhibits 24, 24-A, 25 and 25-A demonstrate
continued defiance of lawful court orders entered by
the District Court of Sherman County, Kansas. During
the October 27, 1988, hearing before Judge Worden on
an accusation in contempt lodged by the Kansas
Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services in
the URESA proceeding, Mr. Anderson testified:
"`Q. (continuing) You were previously in the employ
of Sherman County, Kansas, is that correct?
"`A. That's right.
"`Q. And you on your own initiative resigned that
job, is that correct?
"`A. That's true.
"`Q. Could you state your reasons why you resigned?
"`A. Well, I was garnished in that job and it was
going to be an embarrassment for the county so I
"`Q. Garnished by whom?
"`A. By you I would assume.
"`Q. In other words, a garnishment through whatever
authorities and assignments your ex-wife, Willow
"`A. That's right, that's right.
"`Q. An that is the reason you resigned from the
county, is that correct?
"`A. That's the only reason, that's right.
"`Q. Were any monies actually taken from your
checks at that time?
"`A. No, I don't believe so.
"`Q. So, in other words, at least at that time you
were earning an income and quit that job to avoid
paying Willow Cramlet, correct?
"`A. That's about the size of it. (Exhibit 24,
Having resigned his only gainful employment of recent
years for the stated purpose of avoiding child
support obligations, Respondent was incarcerated for
contempt of court. No appeal was taken from Judge
Worden's decisions under which that court affirmed
the final judgment of the Colorado District Court
against Mr. Anderson in the sum of $61,858.03
(Exhibit 21) and ordered Respondent to commence
payments of $216.00 per month (Exhibit 22).
"6. On November 24, 1988, Mr. Anderson sought
release from jail by writing to Judge Worden:
"`I agree to pay the support ordered by the court
and further agree to seek employment to pay said
support (Exhibit 25).'
That written representation to the Court followed
earlier correspondence between Judge Worden and Mr.
Anderson in which the Court requested definite plans
and assurances of compliance with Mr. Anderson's
child support obligations (Exhibit 25-A). Mr.
Anderson has made no voluntary payment of child
support from the inception of the Colorado court
proceedings in 1978 through the present. At the time
of the hearing before this panel, no evidence or
testimony was offered by Mr. Anderson to suggest a
different course of action."
The panel then recommended suspension, stating:
"There is no uncertainty in distinguishing Mr.
Anderson's unpopular views and his knowing violation
of court orders. The Commentary to Section 6.22, ABA
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, resolves
the pending matter:
"`In many cases, lawyers are suspended when they
knowingly violate court orders. Such knowing
violations can occur when a lawyer fails to comply
with a court order that applies directly to him or
her, as in the case of lawyers who do not comply
with a divorce decree ordering spousal maintenance
or child support.'
Consistent with the American Bar Association's
standard, this panel recommends the imposition of
suspension under Standard 6.22:
"`Suspension is appropriate when a lawyer knows
that he is violating a court order or rule, and
there is injury or potential injury to a client or
a party, or interference or potential interference
with a legal proceeding.'"
The respondent filed exceptions to the report of the hearing
panel. He takes exception to several factual findings which are
not relevant or material. He primarily contends that he did not
violate any court order nor was he ever found guilty of violating
any order for support or custody. He denies that he ever refused
to obey any valid court order. He specifically denies that he
has shown indifference to the legal obligations or defiance to
any lawful order. He further denies that Judge Delaney's findings
are anything more than dicta and nebulous charges.
Respondent contends that he was unjustifiably found in contempt
of court by Judge Worden and that there was no evidence presented
to find he was in contempt of court. However, he did not appeal
Judge Worden's finding of contempt. He further contends that the
agreement he signed to purge himself of contempt and gain his
release from jail was invalid and unenforceable because it was an
adhesion contract. Even if the agreement was valid, respondent
contends he only agreed to pay support ordered by the court and
to seek employment to pay the support. He further contends that,
since there has been no subsequent order by the court to pay
support or a specific time in which to pay it, he did not breach
the agreement. It would serve no useful purpose to reiterate the
nonsensical arguments by the respondent. His oral argument before
this court was a rehashing and a reargument of his divorce action
in Colorado and the URESA proceeding in Sherman County.
Respondent admitted that he has not made one single voluntary
payment of child support since he was divorced in 1978. He
testified before Judge Worden that he quit his position as county
counselor to avoid paying child support as ordered by the
Colorado district court. He continues to argue that the orders of
the Colorado district court and Judge Worden were not valid. That
argument should have been made on appeal of those orders and not
in this proceeding. There was ample evidence to support the
panel's findings that respondent's conduct and behavior evidenced
a contempt for judicial process and an indifference to ...
Buy This Entire Record For