Unified School District No. 229 awarded a construction
management services contract to J.E. Dunn Construction Company
without soliciting sealed bids from other contractors. Seventeen
general contractors filed this action seeking (1) a declaratory
judgment that K.S.A. 1988 Supp. 72-6760 required the school
district to solicit sealed bids; (2) a restraining order and
injunction barring the school board from approving the contract
and from proceeding with the project until sealed bids were
accepted and reviewed; and (3) a writ of mandamus ordering the
board to cancel and re-let the contract using competitive
bidding. The trial court denied the restraining order and later
dismissed all three counts on the grounds that the plaintiff
contractors lacked standing. We affirm without reaching the
question of standing.
"The reasons given by the district court for its decisions are
immaterial so long as its ruling was correct for any reason."
State Bank v. Hoefgen, 245 Kan. 236, 245, 777 P.2d 811 (1989).
"If the decision below is correct for any reason, it must be
affirmed." Yellow Freight System, Inc. v. Kansas Commission on
Civil Rights, 214 Kan. 120, 124, 519 P.2d 1092 (1974). We
conclude that the trial court's decision was correct because
K.S.A. 1988 Supp. 72-6760, upon which the plaintiffs base their
entire cause of action, is not applicable to this case.
The contract between U.S.D. No. 229 and Dunn is based on a
"Standard Form of Agreement Between Owner and Construction
Manager" developed by the American Institute of Architects.
Highly summarized, the contract requires Dunn to develop detailed
construction plans, detailed schedules, and detailed cost
analyses. Dunn is also required to establish bidding
qualifications, to solicit bids, and to make recommendations for
the award of contracts or the rejection of bids. Dunn itself is
not allowed to bid. Once construction is under way, Dunn is
required to supervise and coordinate the various contractors.
Upon substantial completion, Dunn is to conduct inspections and
make recommendations to the architect regarding final inspection.
Dunn is paid a percentage of the "construction cost" for its
K.S.A. 1988 Supp. 72-6760 requires sealed proposals for
construction or for purchase of material, goods, or wares:
"(a) No expenditure involving an amount greater than
$10,000 for construction, reconstruction or
remodeling or for the purchase of materials, goods or
wares shall be made by the board of education of any
school district except upon sealed proposals, and to
the lowest responsible bidder."
The services provided by Dunn in the management services contract
are not covered by K.S.A. 1988 Supp. 72-6760.
In the 1985 bound volume of Kansas Statutes Annotated, Volume
5A, there is a cross-reference under K.S.A. 72-6760 to the
"prompt payment for goods and services" at K.S.A. 75-6401 et
seq. K.S.A. 75-6402 defines government agency to include a
unified school district. It further defines "goods" under
subsection (d) as follows: "`Goods' means any goods, supplies,
materials, equipment or other personal property, but does not
mean any real property." "Services" are defined under subsection
(e) as "any contractual services including architectural,
engineering, medical, financial, consulting or other professional
services, any construction services and any other personal
The legislature has had numerous opportunities to amend the
provisions of 72-6760, but it has not amended the statute to
include contracts for "services." Plaintiffs make an argument
that public policy underlying K.S.A. 1988 Supp. 72-6760 requires
us to read into the statute the type of services that would be
provided by Dunn Construction Company in a "construction
management services contract." The argument is that the public
would be denied the benefits of 72-6760 if the contract in
question were not subject to sealed bid. Whatever merit this
position may have, we are not at liberty to read into the statute
a provision requiring sealed, competitive bidding for contracts
Under these circumstances, we conclude as a matter of law that
the statute upon which plaintiffs base their entire action is not